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The Emerging Good Faith Exception to
the Miranda Rule-A Critique
By MARTiN R. GARDNER*
Several Justices of the United States Supreme Court recently have
espoused a "good faith" exception to the general rule in fourth amend-
ment' cases requiring exclusion of evidence2 obtained in unconstitu-
tional searches or seizures.3 The good faith exception would permit the
use at trial of evidence obtained by government agents who reasonably,
but mistakenly, believed they were conducting a legal search or
seizure.4 Proponents of the exception argue that it would not contra-
vene what they consider the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule-
deterrence of governmental invasions of privacy5-because good faith
misconduct is not deterrable.6 They believe that the rule is not man-
dated by the Constitution, and may therefore be modified by the
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.S., 1969, J.D., 1972,
University of Utah.
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. In addition to the search and seizure context, exclusionary rules also prohibit the
use at trial of certain evidence or testimony obtained by government officials through means
that violate the fifth or sixth amendments. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14
(1980). For a discussion of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, see infra notes 19-73 &
accompanying text.
3. For views espousing a good faith exception, see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
501, 538 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring, White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring in part); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4. See infra notes 74-83 & accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger would go so far as
to allow the use of evidence obtained when government agents negligently violate the fourth
amendment. See infra notes 75-77 & accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 74-83.
6. "When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on
reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is later excluded, the exclusion
can have no deterrent effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing). See infra note 79 & accompanying text.
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Court.7 Although the proposed good faith exception is highly contro-
versial,8 it may soon become law.9
The Court has broached the subject of an analogous good faith
exception o for certain evidence obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Several Justices
have suggested that a violation of "Mfiranda rights" 12 during police in-
terrogation of a criminal suspect should not necessarily prevent the re-
sulting evidence from being used in the suspect's trial.13 Proponents of
this exception perceive the primary purpose of the Miranda exclusion-
7. Chief Justice Burger described the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as a "judi-
cially contrived doctrine." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (the exclusionary rule is
a "judicially-created remedy").
8. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551-58 (1975) (Brennan, J., joined
by Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan,
J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth
Amendment- The "Reasonable' Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 635 (1978); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World- On Drawing
'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith', 43 U. Prr. L. RFv. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981).
9. The Supreme Court is expected to decide this Term whether to adopt a good faith
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d
187 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983) (No. 82-1771); Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983) (No.
82-963). The Court granted certiorari in a third case, Colorado v. Quintero, - Colo. -, 657
P.2d 948 (1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983) (No. 82-1711), but later dismissed
certiorari because of the death of the defendant, 104 S. Ct. 543 (1983).
Some commentators claim that a majority of the Court has already embraced the good
faith exception. See, e.g., Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed
to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. Rv. 51, 67
(1980). Others count four Justices, but expect at least one more to join them. See, e.g.,
LaFave, supra note 8, at 338-40.
10. See infra notes 170-212 & accompanying text. Although there are at least two dis-
tinct formulations of a fifth amendment good faith exception, see infra notes 179-212 &
accompanying text, they will be referred to jointly in this Article as the good faith exception.
11. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be. . . com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. ... U.S. CONST. amend V.
12. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussed infra at notes 128-69 &
accompanying text).
13. For intimations of a good faith exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule, see Mich-
igan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (discussed infra at notes 179-192). See also Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422-27 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (in addition to advocating
a good faith exception to Miranda, proposes a further good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule in certain situations in which the police restrict suspects' exercise of the sixth
amendment right to counsel) (discussed infra at notes 193-206). Cf. New York v. Quarles,
52 U.S.L.W. 4790 (U.S. June 12, 1984) (No. 82-1213) ("public safety" exception to Mi-
randa). This Article does not address the sixth amendment issue.
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ary rule to be the same as that of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule-deterrence of governmental misconduct. 14 They argue that, be-
cause good faith violations of Miranda rights do not involve intentional
or negligent governmental misconduct, no deterrent effect is achieved
by excluding the evidence obtained.' 5 Although many commentators
have considered the good faith exception to the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule,' 6 there has been little scholarly analysis of the propri-
ety of a similar exception in the fifth amendment context.' 7
This Article first examines the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule and the proposed good faith exception to that rule. It then traces
the history of the exclusionary rule in fifth amendment self-incrimina-
tion cases and examines the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona. Throughout, the focus is on the doctrinal divergence
of the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules. The Article con-
siders and criticizes proposals for a good faith exception to the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule, and discusses the practical implications
of the proposed exception. The discussion demonstrates that the pur-
ported analogy between the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary
rules rests on a fundamental confusion about the scope and purpose of
the fifth amendment rule, particularly regarding the appropriate role of
deterrence theory in the fifth amendment context. The Article con-
cludes that whatever the merits of a fourth amendment good faith ex-
ception, the proposed fifth amendment exception would subvert
fundamental constitutional principles and seriously threaten the vital-
ity of Miranda.'8 Therefore, the Court should eschew any good faith
exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule.
14. See infra notes 172-78 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 170-78 & accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 8, at 644-57; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. RaV. 929, 952 (1965); LaFave, supra note 8, at 333-59;
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 410-63; Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: 4
Requirement of Constitutional Princple, 69 J. CGlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 155 (1978);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blundered?, 50 Tax. L. Rav. 736, 740
(1972).
17. Several commentators have noted the Court's references to a good faith exception
in Miranda cases but have not fully explored the ramifications of such an exception. See,
e.g., Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Ffth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition,
61 MINN. L. REv. 383, 417 n.168 (1977); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 124-25; Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle:
Miranda . Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 201 (1979).
18. See infra notes 240-85 & accompanying text.
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The Fourth Amendment and the Proposed Good Faith
Exception
The Divergence of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule From Its Fifth
Amendment Counterpart
For most of the twentieth century the exclusionary rule has been
used to enforce the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures. While earlier Supreme Court decisions sug-
gested that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was constitutionally
mandated, recent cases have established that the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule is a subconstitutional doctrine aimed at deterring gov-
ernmental invasion of privacy. A brief history of search and seizure
jurisprudence will illuminate the doctrinal divergence of the fourth and
fifth amendment exclusionary rules.
Early Fourth Amendment Decisions
In the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,19 the Supreme Court
forbade federal courts from using in criminal trials evidence obtained
through illegal searches and seizures.20 The Weeks Court feared that if
illegally obtained evidence were not suppressed, federal courts would
condone "a manifest neglect if not an open defiance" of the Constitu-
tion.21 This explanation for the exclusionary rule, which may be called
the judicial integrity rationale,22 clearly suggested that the rule is con-
stitutionally mandated.
However, the Court reached a different conclusion thirty-five years
later in Wolf v. Colorado.23 While the Wof Court recognized that the
fourth amendment, and its protection against governmental invasions
of privacy,24 applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,25 the states were not constitutionally required
to adopt the exclusionary rule.2 6 The Court reasoned that because de-
terring unreasonable searches and seizures was the main purpose of the
exclusionary rule,27 and because such devices as private and adminis-
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. Id. at 398.
21. Id. at 394.
22. The concept of "judicial integrity" will be used in this Article to describe the avoid-
ance of judicial participation in governmental wrongdoing. See id. at 392.
23. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Id. at 27. See also id. at 30.
25. Id. at 27-28.
26. Id. at 28-31.''-
27. Id. at 31.
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trative remedies applied against offending government agents could de-
ter illegal intrusions just as effectively,28 the states should be free to
adopt whatever remedy would provide the desired deterrent effect.29
The judicial integrity rationale of Weeks was reinterpreted in Wolf as a
subconstitutional consideration 30 reflecting, perhaps, an exercise of the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the federal courts rather than
an interpretation of the Constitution.3 1
The Mapp Decision and Justice Harlan's Dissent
Twelve years later, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio32 effectively over-
ruled Wolf and required the states to apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. 33 The Court's
rationale was, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, it maintained
that the exclusionary rule was required in state cases because other
remedies had been "worthless and futile, '3 4 thereby suggesting that the
rule itself might not be constitutionally mandated. 35 On the other
hand, Mapp set out two theories implying that the rule must be im-
posed regardless of whether other remedies might deter invasions of
privacy as effectively.
First, the Mapp Court repeated that, in addition to its deterrent
function, the exclusionary rule maintains judicial integrity. The Court
declared that "[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than
its failure to observe its own laws" 36 and that the judicial use of ille-
gally obtained evidence makes a "lawbreaker" of the government, in-
28. Id. at 29.
29. "Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn. . . a State's reliance
upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." Id. at 31.
30. The Wolf Court described the exclusionary rule in Weeks as a "matter of judicial
implication" that was "not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 28. Moreover, the Wolf Court intimated that Congress could legislatively
overrule Weeks. Id. at 33. Finally, the Wolf Court subtly reinterpreted Weeks to substitute
a deterrence rationale for the judicial integrity rationale. Id. at 31-33.
31. See id. at 39 (Black, J., concurring).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Id. at 655.
34. Id. at 652.
35. The Court pointed out that without an effective remedy fourth amendment rights
are meaningless. Id. at 656. Failure to require the States to adopt the exclusionary rule
would be tantamount to "grant[ing] the [fourth amendment] right but in reality. . . with-
hold[ing] its privilege and enjoyment." Id. (emphasis added). The "in reality" language
may be interpreted to mean that the exclusionary rule is a practical requirement, not a con-
stitutional one.
36. Id. at 659.
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vites "contempt for law," and ultimately produces "anarchy."
37
Second, the Court developed another exclusionary rule theory
based not on deterrence but on the "intimate relation" between the
fourth amendment and the coerced confession doctrine38 derived from
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.39 This theory, herein called the
coerced confession analogy, was based on the Court's belief that the
fourth amendment and the coerced confession doctrine protected the
same interest, personal privacy.4° Given that the Constitution clearly
requires courts to exclude coerced testimony,41 "Why," asked the
Court, "should not the same rule apply to what is tantamount to co-
erced testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers,
effects, documents, etc.?" 42
This analogy was consistent with the Court's earlier view that the
fourth and fifth amendments run "almost into each other" in protecting
the same "privacies of life" against governmental intrusion.43 This
37. Id. This suggests that the rule may be constitutionally mandated. If judicial use of
illegally obtained evidence renders the government a "lawbreaker" and leads to "anarchy,"
the exclusionary rule ought to be required due to the Constitution's role as protector of the
legal order.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 115-24.
39. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656-57. The Court cited Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1896), a case decided under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, id. at
542, as support for the view that coerced confessions are inadmissible in federal cases. But
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 527-28 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (the fifth amend-
ment privilege might have been improperly applied in Bran).
The Mapp Court also cited Roger v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), a fourteenth
amendment due process case, for the proposition that coerced confessions must be sup-
pressed in state cases. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. The Court's failure to refer to self-incrimina-
tion doctrine in the state context was at least partly due to the fact that at the time of Aapp
the fifth amendment privilege was not yet applicable to the States. See Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (extending the protection of the fifth amendment to defendants in state
courts).
40. Aapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 656.
43. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). The Boyd Court held that the
federal government was precluded, under both the fourth amendment and the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, from using as evidence in a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding an invoice obtained by a court order from two partners suspected of fraudulently
attempting to import glass without paying the prescribed duty. The potentially incriminat-
ing invoice was viewed by the Court as private property and thus constitutionally protected.
The Court explained:
The [fourth and fifth amendment] principles laid down in this opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances;
they apply to all invasions on the part of the government, and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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concept of privacy entailed extensive protection of personal property.
The fourth amendment protected individuals from seizures of personal
property that was not an instrumentality of crime, even when govern-
ment agents obtained a search warrant prior to the seizure.44 The fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination also protected the indi-
vidual from relinquishing personalty if it tended to be incriminating.45
The Court had declared that "we have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a wit-
ness against himself."46
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, dis-
sented in Mapp, rejecting the analogy between the fourth amendment
and the coerced confession exclusionary rules and objecting to the ma-
jority's suggestion that the fourth amendment rule is constitutionally
mandated.47 He saw the exclusionary rule developed in Weeks as sim-
ply "a remedy which, by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed
at deterring such conduct in the future," and rejected both the judicial
integrity theory and the coerced confession analogy.4 8
In Justice Harlan's view, allowing state courts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence did not unconstitutionally sacrifice judicial integrity
because it did not detract from the ultimate fairness of trials.49 More-
over, he argued that the doctrines requiring exclusion of coerced con-
fessions are distinctly "disanalogous" to exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment; the former are excluded to en-
sure that judicial proceedings are "accusatorial" rather than "inquisito-
rial," whereas the latter is excluded to deter actions of the police.50
According to Harlan, the fourth amendment provides substantive pro-
44. The rule exempting private property from evidentiary consideration under the
fourth amendment came to be known as the "mere evidence" rule. See Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967). Contraband or stolen goods were not exempt from governmen-
tal seizure, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), and neither were instrumen-
talities of crime, see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1921).
45. See supra note 43 (discussion of Boyd). For a discussion of the Court's early view
equating personalty and privacy, see generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Consti-
tutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Ffth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945
(1977).
46. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
47. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 680.
49. Id. at 683.
50. Id. at 684-85. "The point, then, must be that in requiring exclusion of an involun-
tary statement of an accused, we are concerned not with an appropriate remedy for what the
police have done, [as in the fourth amendment context,] but with something which is re-
garded as going to the heart of our concepts of fairness in judicial procedure." Id. at 684.
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tection of privacy, whereas the coerced confession doctrine has little to
do with privacy protection and is not violated until an unlawfully ob-
tained statement is admitted at trial.51
Rejection of the Coerced Confession Analogy
Although Mapp has not been overruled, subsequent decisions have
eroded its theoretical foundation. The Court apparently has adopted
Justice Harlan's arguments. Privacy protection is no longer considered
to be an important fifth amendment value.5 2 In addition, the Court
51. Id. at 684. Justice Harlan explained in detail:
The pressures brought to bear against an accused leading to a confession, unlike an
unconstitutional violation of privacy, do not, apart from the use of the confession
at trial, necessarily involve independent Constitutional violations. What is crucial
is that the trial defense to which an accused is entitled should not be rendered an
empty formality by reason of statements wrung from him, for then "a prisoner...
[has been] made the deluded instrument of his own conviction.".. . That this is a
procedural right, and that its violation occurs at the time his improperly obtained
statement is admitted at trial, is manifest. For without this right all the careful
safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been ob-
tained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police. This, and not the disciplining of
the police, as with illegally seized evidence, is surely the true basis for excluding a
statement of the accused which was unconstitutionally obtained.
Id. at 684-85 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Thus, while the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule is merely one of several possible remedies available to deter illegal inva-
sions of privacy, the coerced confession rule is an exclusionary rule mandated by the
Constitution.
52. The Court's first step toward disassociating privacy protection from the fifth
amendment was virtually imperceptable. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), a
fourth amendment case, the Court upheld the introduction of items of "mere evidence"--a
cap, a jacket, and a pair of trousers-into evidence. Hayden established the principle that
any evidence, even private property, could be seized under the fourth amendment so long as
a search warrant is obtained or an exception to the warrant rule--the "hot pursuit" excep-
tion in Hayden--exists. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 156-57. By rejecting the
"mere evidence" rule, see supra note 44, the Hayden Court removed the fourth amendment
barrier against seizures of personal property and applied an analysis focusing entirely on the
manner in which the government obtains the property rather than on the nature of the prop-
erty itself. See Note, supra note 45, at 567-71.
Once "mere evidence" became admissible under the fourth amendment, the Court soon
removed the fifth amendment protection of private property. In Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1976), the Court held that the fifth amendment provides no protection against an
otherwise permissible search and seizure of private papers containing incriminating state-
ments made by the accused.
Privacy protection under the fifth amendment suffered a further blow in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), in which the Court held that except in certain cases
threatening the separate attorney-client privilege, a summons directing a third party to sur-
render the defendant's private papers could never violate the fifth amendment because it
would not constitute personal 96mpulsion against the accused. Id. at 396-405. The Fisher
Court disavowed privacy protection as a fifth amendment value:
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currently does not consider the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to
be constitutionally mandated; rather, it is merely one of several possi-
ble remedies available to deter illegal invasions of privacy. Conse-
quently, the Court has explicitly rejected the coerced confession
analogy.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,53 the Court stated that fourth
amendment rights are "of a wholly different order" than fifth amend-
ment rights.5 4 The Court held that under the fourth amendment one
can validly consent to be searched even without knowing that one has a
right to refuse.5 5 The Court declined to require government agents to
give Miranda-like warnings before asking for consent because "[t]here
is a vast difference between [fifth amendment] rights that protect a fair
criminal trial and the [privacy] rights guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment. ' 56 Although the fourth and fifth amendments once
seemed to "run almost into each other" in their protection of privacy,57
Schneckloth suggests they now follow clearly separate paths.
The Court indirectly attacked the coerced confession analogy of
Mapp in United States v. Calandra,58 in which it held that grand jury
witnesses cannot refuse to answer questions based on information ob-
tained through illegal searches. 59 Extending the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule to grand juries would not have any deterrent effect, the
Court reasoned, because illegally obtained evidence was already inad-
missible in criminal trials.60 The majority described the exclusionary
rule as a "judicially created remedy designed to safegard fourth
amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."'61 Through its em-
The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy in the Fourth Amendment.
They struck a balance so that when the State's reason to believe incriminating evi-
dence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes
justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue. They did not seek in still
another amendment-the Fifth-to achieve a general protection of privacy but to
deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.
Id. at 400.
53. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
54. Id. at 242.
55. Id. at 234.
56. Id. at 241-42. The Schneckloth Court believed that the basis for the Miranda deci-
sion was the need to protect the fairness of the trial process. Id. at 240.
57. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
58. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
59. Id. at 349.
60. Id. at 351.
61. Id. at 348. Justice Brennan dissented, lamenting that the majority was committed
to a course that could lead to the abandonment of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
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phasis on deterrence theory, the Court downplayed Mapp's judicial in-
tegrity theory62 and the coerced confession analogy.63
In the 1976 case of Stone v. Powell,64 the Court went further by
explicitly rejecting the Mapp Court's judicial integrity theory. The
Stone decision forbade federal courts from granting a state prisoner
habeas corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds if the state court
had "provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] Fourth
Amendment claim." 65 Once again, the Court emphasized that the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule was judicially created, 66 and
designed solely to deter police misconduct. 67 The Court discredited the
judicial integrity theory by pointing out that illegally obtained evidence
has traditionally been admitted when the defendant fails, or lacks
standing, to object.68
The coerced confession analogy was explicitly discredited in
United States v. Janis,6 9 decided the same day as Stone. In Janis the
Court held that illegally obtained evidence, although inadmissible in
state criminal trials, was admissible in federal civil tax proceedings. 70
As in Stone, the Court relied exclusively on deterrence theory;7 1 it rea-
soned that the state police were already deterred by the inadmissibility
of illegally obtained evidence in criminal proceedings. The Court con-
cluded that extending the exclusionary rule to tax proceedings would
Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). He feared that if
deterrence became the sole justification for the rule, illegally obtained evidence would sel-
dom be suppressed. "I. . .fear that when next we confront a case of a conviction rested on
illegally seized evidence, today's decision will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that
case also, that 'it is unrealistic to assume' that application of the rule at trial would 'signifi-
cantly further' the goal of deterrence-though, if the police are presently undeterred, it is
difficult to see how removal of the sanction of exclusion will induce more lawful official
conduct." Id. at 365-66. Government lawlessness would remain unabated. "Unless we are
to shut our eyes to the evidence that crosses our desks every day, we must concede that
official lawlessness has not abated." Id. at 365. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32
(1976) (literature debating the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule).
62. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 365.
63. Id.
64. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
65. Id. at 494.
66. Id. at 482. Not only had the fourth amendment exclusionary rule lost virtually all
its force as a constitutionally mandated doctrine by the time of Stone, it had, in the minds of
some Justices, become a pernicious device for releasing guilty offenders back into society. In
his concurring opinion in Stone, Chief Justice Burger described the rule as a "Draconian,
discredited device." Id. at 500 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
67. Id. at 486.
68. Id. at 485.
69. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
70. Id. at 460.
71. .d. at 446-54.
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not deter any fourth amendment violations.72 While embracing deter-
rence theory, the Court rejected the coerced confession analogy as a
basis for excluding the evidence:
[The] comparatively late judicial creation of a Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule [in Weeks] is not particularly surprising. In con-
trast to the Ffth Amendment's direct command against the admission
of compelled testimony, the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is determined after, and apartfrom,
the violation 73
In sum, fifteen years after Mapp a majority of the Supreme Court
had adopted Justice Harlan's view that the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule was based not upon a direct constitutional mandate but
upon a subconstitutional policy of deterrence. In contrast, as discussed
below, the Court has clearly recognized that the fifth amendment ex-
clusionary rule is constitutionally required. This distinction becomes
critical when determining whether either rule can be judicially
modified.
The Proposed Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule
As deterrence theory emerged as the overriding justification for
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, several Justices suggested that
illegally obtained evidence should not be excluded when the police had
acted in good faith; such misconduct is not deterrable. 74 Chief Justice
Burger, for example, proposed limiting the exclusionary rule to "egre-
gious, bad faith conduct." 75 He argued that penalizing police for inad-
vertent errors of judgment and honest mistakes exacts an exorbitant
cost to law enforcement, 76 and that the exclusionary rule could be elim-
inated altogether if an "effective alternative remedy" were found.77
Burger's "bad faith" standard, if taken literally, would exclude evi-
dence only when the police intentionally or recklessly violate the fourth
amendment.
72. Id. at 458.
73. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). Previously, the Court had made similar observations:
"The exclusionary rule ... when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves inter-
ests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. It is directed at all
unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating
material or testimony as fruits." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975).
74. See supra note 6 and infra notes 172-75 & accompanying text.
75. Stone, 428 U.S. at 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
76. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 414.
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Other Justices have proposed a more moderate good faith excep-
tion. Justice Powell has asserted that the exclusionary rule should be
applied only when "the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct that has deprived the defendant of some
right. ' 78 Justice White has urged that the rule should not be applied "in
those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an
officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with
existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief."
'79
This term, the Supreme Court will decide whether to recognize a
fourth amendment good faith exception. 80 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has already held that "evidence is not to be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of
actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mis-
taken, belief that they are authorized. ' 81 Although the language of
some recent cases suggests that the Court might adopt the Chief Jus-
tice's theory,82 the Court is more likely to adopt a view similar to the
Fifth Circuit rule.83
Recognition of a good faith exception to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule might be seen as paving the way for a similar excep-
tion to Miranda's fifth amendment exclusionary rule. The following
sections of the Article discuss the jurisprudence of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and demonstrate that, regardless of
the Court's decision on the fourth amendment issue, adoption of a
good faith exception to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule would
contravene the principles upon which the privilege is based.
78. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 443, 447 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.)).
79. Stone, 428 U.S. at 538, 540 (White, J., dissenting).
80. See supra note 9.
81. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. "[W]hile the officer's belief about the scope of the warrant ...may well have been
erroneous.. . the conduct of the police here does not rise to the level of conscious orflagrant
misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion of petitioner's (subsequent incriminating] state-
ment." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1979) (emphasis added). "Application of
the exclusionary rule [when no showing is made that the police officer purposely violated the
fourth amendment] could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer
such as [this]." United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978).
83. It is likely that Chief Justice Burger would concur with the position of Justices
White, Powell, and Rehnquist, which is a less extreme version of his own view. Some specu-
late that Justice O'Connor will also advocate some form of good faith exception, thereby
forming a majority. See LaFave, supra note 8, at 340.
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The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and
the Miranda Rule
Purposes of the Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination 4 protects persons85 from
84. In providing that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself," U.S. CONST. amend. V, the fifth amendment embodies a principle
borrowed from the common law and derived from centuries of struggle against tyranny.
The history is well documented in L. LEVY, OIOINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
The privilege was developed during the English struggle to obtain freedom of religion and
of speech, and was designed to protect those who were accused of religious crimes such as
heresy, of political crimes such as treason, or of criticizing the government. Id. at 332. By
the mid-seventeenth century, the privilege had been incorporated into English common law,
with which it emigrated to America. Id. at 303. See also E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMEND-
MENT TODAY 4 (1955).
The English origins of the privilege do not explain its present function. "[I]t would be
ludicrous to attempt to fix the proper scope of the privilege in light of what was appropriate
under the Stuarts or Cromwell." Friendly, The F#ih Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 679 (1968). 'To say that the struggle to
establish the right [against self-incrimination] in America duplicated or even paralled the
struggle in England would be a gross exaggeration because there was never in the colonies a
Court of High Commission or a Star Chamber. Yet, they had their rough equivalents at
certain times in certain colonies." L. LEVY, supra, at 339. Moreover, the scant colonial
history of the privilege offers little help in understanding the intent of the Framers. Id. at
334; McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation,
Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
223, 224 (C. Sowle ed. 1962). "[P]erhaps it is fruitless to search for some evil precisely envis-
aged by the early constitutional draftsmen, an evil at which the provision against self-in-
crimination was deliberately aimed." L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT?. 221 (1959). Moreover, by the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the found-
ing fathers may well have perceived the privilege to be relatively insignificant in relation to
other provisions expressed therein. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908).
Some go so far as to suggest that, unlike other Bill of Rights provisions, the privilege is
pernicious:
"[T]he privilege is... exceptional.., in the general setting of jurisprudence and
morality. While it carries the burden of impeding ascertainment of that truth that
is common to all testimonial privileges, it has uncommon burdens as well ....
[T]he fifth amendment privilege extends, by hypothesis, only to persons who have
been breakers of the criminal law or believe they may be charged as such. Again,
while the other privileges accord with notions of decent conduct generally accepted
in life outside the court room, the privilege against self-incrimination defies them.
No parent would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is
that while a misdeed, even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to
make a clean breast of it will not be."
Friendly, supra, at 679-80. "Mhe wisdom and justice of the privilege against giving self-
incriminatory testimony are far less evident than most of the rights and privileges of the Bill
of Rights." S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 24 (1957).
85. "The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal
one, applying only to natural individuals." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
The privilege is not available to corporations, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911),
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having incriminating testimonial8 6 evidence introduced against them
during criminal proceedings, if the evidence was obtained through gov-
ernmental 87 compulsion.88 The Court has construed the constitutional
phrase "criminal cases" 89 to protect anyone who refuses to answer "of-
ficial questions put to him in any... proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings." 90 Furthermore, the Court has interpreted "in-
criminating evidence" to include compelled testimony that might only
indirectly incriminate a person by "furnishfing] a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute" him.91 But once the possibility of in-
crimination is eliminated, either because the statutes of limitations
have expired or because the government has granted immunity, a wit-
ness may be compelled to respond 92 to governmental questions even
though his answers might tend to expose him to embarrassment, dis-
grace, or criticism.93 Immunity grants protect the witness from eviden-
tiary use, not only of the immunized testimony itself, but also of
evidence derived therefrom. 94
Stating the doctrine of the privilege is a great deal easier than ac-
counting for its rationale. Indeed, the Court has appealed to diverse
policy considerations in a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to articulate
associations, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), or non-personal partnerships,
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
86. "Non-testimonial" evidence such as blood samples, fingerprints, and other physical
evidence is not protected by the privilege even though such evidence might be "incriminat-
mng." See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (voice and body in suspect
lineups are physical characteristics of a non-testimonial nature); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (extraction of blood sample without defendant's consent does not
violate privilege).
87. The fifth amendment privilege applies to state as well as federal governmental ac-
tion. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
88. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 256.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend V.
90. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (privilege protects grand jury witnesses
from compelled self-incrimination).
91. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). See infra notes 94, 232-36 &
accompanying text (derivative evidence discussion).
92. The guarantee of the privilege "is only that the witness be not compelled to give self-
incriminating testimony." United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (emphasis
in original and added).
93. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896). Accord Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 100 (1964) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he privilege does not convey
an absolute right to remain silent. It protects a witness from being compelled to furnish
evidence that could result in his being subjected to a criminal sanction.").
94. Counseiman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See infra notes 233-39 & accompa-
nying text.
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the underlying values protected by the privilege.95 As a result, "the
continuting debate over the policies underlying the right to silence is of
considerable importance." 96
The Court's eclectic approach to the privilege is illustrated by its
1964 decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.97 In Murphy the
Court declared that the privilege reflects many of our most fundamen-
tal values and noble aspirations, including
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhu-
mane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance . . . requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load,". . our re-
spect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right
of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life,". . . our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realiza-
tion that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter for the guilty," is
often "a protection to the innocent."98
Unfortunately, many of these statements are so vague as to be of lim-
ited use99 and others merely restate the privilege.1°°
Courts and commentators, however, have carefully examined the
various policies enunciated in the cases and literature,10 ' and have sug-
gested that there are four central purposes of the privilege: 1) preserv-
ing the accusatorial nature of the criminal justice system,102 2)
95. "[T]he policy functions of the privilege have never been fully delineated or ex-
plained by the courts." Berger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15
AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 191, 194 (1978). The Supreme Court has "inadequately articulated" the
policies of the privilege. Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment Right to Si-
lence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 197, 200 (1979). See supra note 84.
96. Schiller, supra note 95, at 198.
97. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
98. Id. at 55.
99. For example, the Court makes no attempt to define what it means by "the inviola-
bility of the human personality" or in what sense "privacy" interests are protected by the
privilege. Moreover, the distinction between "accusatorial" and "inquisitorial" models of
criminal justice is not always clear. See infra note 157.
Resort to such value-laden considerations moved one commentator to describe the fifth
amendment privilege as "an ultimate article of faith," Paulsen, The Constitutional Domesti-
cation of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 233, 238, and led another to suggest that the
privilege "is treated with almost religious adulation," Friendly, supra note 84, at 681.
100. For example, in asserting the value of "requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load," Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, the Court does little
more than restate the privilege. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967
Sup. CT. REv. 193, 208-09; see also McNaughton, supra note 84, at 230 & n.34.
101. See generally McNaughton, supra note 84, at 227-37.
102. "Mhe fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment [is] the preservation of an
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protecting the suspect's dignity and free will against the power of the
state, 10 3 3) ensuring the reliability of evidence, 1°4 and 4) protecting in-
dividual fights of privacy. 10 5
The first two policies should be considered the main underpin-
nings of the privilege against self-incrimination. 10 6 The third is pro-
tected by traditional due process requirements. 0 7 The fourth has been
eroded by allowing compelled disclosure once immunity is prom-
ised,108 and has been explicitly disavowed in recent cases. 109 These as-
adversary system of criminal justice." Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
See Stone, supra note 17, at 156.
103. "[T]he great purpose [of the self-incrimination clause is the] protection of the lone
individual against the all-powerful state." Friendly, supra note 84, at 723. The privilege
"protects the individual against the collective power of the state." E. GRISWOLD, supra note
84, at 30. "While deeply committed to perpetuating a system that minimized the possibili-
ties of convicting the innocent, [the framers] were not less concerned about the humanity
that the fundamental law should show even to the offender." L. LEvY, supra note 84, at 432.
"[M]ost importantly, [the privilege] serves the function of assuring that even guilty individu-
als are treated in a manner consistent with basic respect for human dignity." MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 252 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
104. "The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy,
that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). See MCCORMICK, supra note 103, at 252; Sunderland,
supra note 16, at 187 ("Various forms of coercion may force an individual to admit practi-
cally anything" and thereby generate "testimonially untrustworthy" evidence).
105. See Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (the privilege "stands as
a protection of. . .the right of each individual to be let alone"); United States v. Grune-
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting in part) (the privilege safe-
guards the individual's "right of privacy, a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life"); Berger, supra note 95, at 213 ("human dignity" and "individual privacy" are
two equally important values that should be protected by the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation); McKay, supra note 100, at 209-11 (the "real reasons" for the privilege are to pre-
serve the integrity of the accusatorial system and to protect "individual privacy").
106. The "real" purpose of the privilege is to protect the humanity of the suspect and his
"sovereignty" against being conscripted by the state to defeat himself. McNaugton, supra
note 84, at 237. "Mhe Burger Court sees the primary constitutional purpose of the privilege
[as]: [the] preserv[ation of] an accusatorial system of justice in which the government must
prove its case without the use of evidence forced from the mouth of the accused." Ritchie,
supra note 17, at 388.
107. See McKay, supra note 100, at 206 (abusive treatment that would result in eviden-
tiary unreliability is adequately deterred by due process guarantees); see also supra notes 84-
96 & accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 97-100 & accompanying text. Many commentators reject the no-
tion that protecting privacy is a main purpose of the self-incrimination clause. See, e.g.,
Friendly, supra note 84, at 688. Even advocates of the privacy rationale admit difficulty in
reconciling the rationale with current Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Berger, supra note
95, at 194-95, 213; McKay, supra note 100, at 230; Ritchie, supra note 17, at 391-98.
109. See supra note 52 and infra notes 152-54 & accompanying text; see also United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) (the privilege cannot be invoked simply to
protect the grand jury witness' interest in privacy).
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serted purposes form the background against which the development of
the Miranda exclusionary rule and the propriety of a good faith excep-
tion to that rule can be assessed.
The Admissibility of Confessions Before Miranda: The Due Process
Analysis
Before Miranda v. A4rizona 1 0 was decided in 1966, the law gov-
erning the admissibility of pretrial confessions was based largely on
doctrines other than the privilege against self-incrimination. The earli-
est state cases arose in the 1930s and 1940s and concerned testimony
compelled through physical coercion and police brutality. The
Supreme Court ruled that such testimony must be excluded on due
process grounds,"' because such police conduct was "revolting to the
sense of justice" 112 and the resulting evidence was likely unreliable. 113
Excluding involuntary confessions later came to be seen as a means of
promoting the values of an accusatorial system of criminal justice, and
ensuring "fair play and decency."' "14
Toward these ends, the Court created two tests' 15 : a subjective test
for determining whether the particular confession was voluntary," 6
110. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), was the Court's first state coerced confes-
sion case. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 281-82. In Brown, the police had dictated
confessions to a murder and then extorted signatures from three black defendants by hang-
ing and whipping theim. The Court excluded these confessions on due process grounds.
Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-83, 287. See also Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (com-
pelled confessions excluded on due process grounds); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
238-43 (1940) (same).
112. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
113. Id. at 283. The "untrustworthiness" rationale-the view that the coerced confes-
sion doctrine was designed merely to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process-could
explain the result in Brown. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 553-54 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Y. KAMISAR].
114. [Ilnvoluntary confessions are inadmissible not because such confessions are
unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an under-
lying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). "Use of involuntary verbal confessions in
State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability.
They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in
them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the commu-
nity's sense of fair play and decency." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). See
also MCCORMICK, supra note 103, at 316.
115. The distinction between the subjective and objective tests is discussed in detail in
McCoRMICK, supra note 103, at 317-21.
116. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) (confession of suspect of
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and an objective test for determining whether the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession were inherently coercive. 117 The subjective
test was designed to ascertain whether in a particular case the confes-
sion was essentially the result of a free choice. 118 The objective test, in
theory, was designed to determine whether the interrogation offended
basic standards of fairness and decency." 9 No single factor, with the
possible exception of direct physical coercion, guaranteed that a confes-
sion would be inadmissible under the objective test.120
These due process tests, referred to jointly as the "coerced confes-
sion doctrine," often proved inadequate to protect the rights of sus-
pects. The Court never resolved whether the true evil was unreliable
evidence or obnoxious police behavior, 12' resulting in confusion re-
low mentality and weak will inadmissible because of presumed effect of prolonged question-
ing without visitation privileges).
117. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). "[C]ertain coercive interrogation
techniques result in an 'involuntary' confession as a matter of law, irrespective of the likeli-
hood that they did or could produce afalse confession and irrespective of their effect on the
actual defendant before the court." White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 581, 583-84 (1979) (emphasis in original).
118. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). "[T]he test of 'voluntariness'is
subjective . . . . Whether or not particular police conduct amounts to coercion depends
upon the individual characteristics of the supect interrogated-his 'power of resistance.'...
What constitutes coercion for one accused will not do so for another because it takes greater
pressure to overbear the 'power of resistance' of one individual than another." Comment,
The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cmt. L. REv. 313, 318-19
(1964).
119. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). In Malinski, the accused, isolated
from friends and counsel, was required by the police to stand naked for three hours, and
then permitted to partially clothe himself for occasional questioning during the next seven
hours, until he confessed. Id. at 405. The Court reversed his conviction without determin-
ing that the confession was actually involuntary. Id. at 410.
120. McCoRMICK, supra note 103, at 318-19. Even physically abused suspects did not
always have their confessions suppressed. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941), in which the Court permitted use of a confession obtained after a police officer had
slapped the suspect. Although the slap was unlawful under state law, it did not render the
subsequent confession "coerced." Id. at 230-41. But see Brown v. Mississippi, 247 U.S. 278,
285-86 (1936) (the severe physical coercion by police appears to have resulted in a finding
that the confessions were coerced because of the police brutality by itself).
121. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 113, at 557. Some commentators have found other faults
in the voluntariness test:
Judicial decisions speak in terms of the "voluntariness" of a confession, but the
term itself provides little guidance. To the extent "voluntariness" has made a deter-
mination of the state of an individual's will the crucial question, it has not assisted.
analysis. Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks ca-
pacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements--even those made under
brutal treatment are "voluntary" in the sense of representing a choice of alterna-
tives. On the other hand, if "voluntariness" incorporates notions of "but-for"
cause, the question should be whether the statement would have been made even
absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no statement
[Vol. 35
garding the basis of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule. Moreover,
the court did not sufficiently explain the objective test so that constitu-
tionally appropriate interrogation could be readily distinguished from
its unlawful counterpart.122 Because defendants had difficulty recreat-
ing in court the interrogation atmosphere,123 the police usually won the
inevitable swearing contest.' 24 The result of courts applying these two
due process tests in a non-uniform manner was confusion as to the na-
ture and scope of suspects' rights.
The inadequacy of the coerced confession doctrine and the unde-
sirability of case-by-case analysis of the constitutionality of police in-
terrogations did not go unnoticed by the Supreme Court. Its initial
response, in 1964, was to recognize the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel during interrogation. 25 Ultimately, however, in Miranda v. Ai-
would be voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the
absence of official action of some kind.
Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel- Basic Problems
and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 62, 72-73 (1966).
122. See supra note 120.
123. Y. KAMiSAR, supra note 113, at 557.
124. Id. at 557-58.
125. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), is the leading sixth amendment custodial
interrogation case that is commonly viewed as the precursor of Miranda. See Y. KAMISAR,
supra note 113, at 557. Escobedo dealt with the admissibility of a confession obtained from
a suspect who had twice been arrested on suspicion of murder. After the second arrest the
suspect repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer but was denied access to his attorney
by the police, who interrogated the suspect for four hours until he finally confessed. In
ruling his confession inadmissible under the sixth amendment, the Court stressed the sus-
pect's "absolute constitutional right to remain silent." Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91. The
Court held that
where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied,
"the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment. . . and. . . no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Escobedo Court's recognition of the right to remain "absolutely silent" during in-
terrogation intimated a significant extension of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
Until Escobedo, it seemed that the Constitution only entitled a suspect to refrain
from incriminating himself, not from answering any and all questions (as opposed
to a defendant in a criminal trial who need not "take the stand"), and that the
suspect's "right" to remain absolutely silent in the face of police interrogation-
perhaps more aptly characterized as his "immunity" from being required to answer
any question--stemmed not from the Constitution as such, but from the police
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zona, 126 the Court chose to govern custodial interrogation by requiring
the now-familiar Miranda warnings.127
The Exclusionary Rule of Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda the Court established a strict exclusionary rule, lest the
privilege against self-incrimination degenerate into merely "a form of
words,"' 128 technically applicable at trial but effectively overridden
through inducements of damaging statements gathered in the "inher-
ently coercive" atmosphere of station house interrogation. 129 The
department's lack of legislative authorization to compel an answer. That is to say,
until Escobedo was decided, at any rate, the Constitution did not appear to prohibit
legislatures from investing police with the power to compel non-incriminating an-
swers, although the legislatures had not seen fit to do so.
Y. KAMISAR, supra note 113, at 570.
126. 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
127. For commentary on Miranda, see generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New' Fifth Amendment and the Old 'Voluntariness' Test, 65
MICH. L. RaV. 59 (1966); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogation Rights: Reflections on
Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1978).
The Miranda warnings were meant to supplement the established principles of the co-
erced confession doctrine. Due process considerations still help determine whether state-
ments made by suspects who have been apprised of their rights are truly voluntary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 n.11 (D.D.C. 1973) (although a signed
waiver form is strong evidence that a suspect voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, "[t]he
court must still decide whether, in view of all the circumstances, defendant's subsequent
decision to speak was a product of his free will"); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978) (Court must make due process determination of "voluntariness" of statement given
by suspect who had not waived his Miranda rights before admitting for impeachment pur-
poses). Due process doctrine also is used in assessing the admissibility of statements made
by suspects not in custody. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04, 310 (1966)
(Miranda warnings not required when defendant is not in custody and makes statements to
undercover police agent; statements were "voluntary" and thus admissible under due pro-
cess considerations).
In addition, the Court has recently held that the Miranda warnings are not required in
custodial interrogation situations in which public safety is endangered. New York v.
Quarles, 52 U.S.L.W. 4790 (U.S. June 12, 1984) (No. 82-1213). Thus the sole constitutional
doctrine governing admissibility of statements obtained in such situations is the due process
doctrine. See id. at 4792 n.5.
128. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
129. The Miranda Court made numerous references to the coerciveness inherent in cus-
todial police interrogation. See, e.g., id. at 455, 461, 467, 468, 478; see also id. at 533 (White,
J., dissenting). Given this coercive atmosphere, exercise of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation at trial would be ineffective unless special procedural protections were applied to
station house interrogation.
Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel,
"all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an
accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure
where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have
already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."
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Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether ex-
culpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards ef-
fective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."'130 The Court
reviewed police interrogation manuals and other sources documenting
police interrogation practices, 31 and concluded that warnings were
necessary to deter widespread police misconduct, including the physi-
cal violence and "third degree" tactics that were at times used against
suspects. 132 The Miranda warnings were spelled out 133 as the required
procedural safeguards "unless other fully effective means are
devised." 134
Aside from the risks of police brutality and psychological coercion,
the Court declared that such warnings are necessary to counter the in-
herent compulsion of the police station,135 to protect the suspect's
human dignity 36 and right to a "private enclave,"' 37 to ensure that any
statement made by the suspect would be the product of a free choice, 38
and to preserve an accusatorial system of criminal justice.139 The Court
declared that the Constitution requires a "fair state-individual bal-
ance," 40 which in turn requires the state to obtain evidence against a
defendant through its own independent labor rather than by the "cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from [the defendant's] own
mouth."141
Most importantly for purposes of assessing the propriety of a good
faith exception to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule, the Miranda
Court rejected a case-by-case appraisal; 42 warnings, or their
Id. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
130. Id. at 444.
131. Id. at 445-58. The dissenters criticized the Court's use of these sources as a basis
for the strict exclusionary rule. Id. at 532-33 (White, J., dissenting). "Judged by any of the
standards for empirical investigation utilized in the social sciences, the factual basis for the
Court's premise is inadequate." Id. at 533.
132. Id. at 445-58.
133. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 455-56, 458.
136. Id. at 457.
137. Id. at 460.
138. Id. at 458.
139. Id. at 460.
140. Id. (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
141. Id. (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)).
142. The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitu-
tional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of
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equivalent,143 became a prerequisite to admissibility' 44 even if the pros-
ecution could show that the confessor was aware of his rights.145 An
incriminating statement may still be admitted if the suspect waives the
privilege,146 but the government must meet a "heavy burden" to estab-
lish that there was such a waiver.' 47 The Court implied that the consti-
tutional rights at stake must not be compromised even if law
enforcement might be hampered. 148 Allowing the government to vio-
late individual rights would condemn it to the status of lawbreaker,
subject it to society's contempt, and ultimately lead to anarchy."49
The Purpose of Miranda
The interests the Supreme Court sought to promote through the
Miranda warnings may be considered in light of the four traditional
purposes underlying the privilege against self-incrimination: 1) main-
taining the accusatorial system of criminal justice; 2) protecting the sus-
pect's dignity and free will; 3) ensuring the reliability of testimonial
the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Id. at 468.
143. The Miranda Court was somewhat unclear about the status of the warnings. In
several places the Court suggested that the warnings might be subconstitutional regulations
that could be disregarded if appropriate alternatives were devised. In one passage the Court
noted:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privi-
lege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their crea-
tive rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution
necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compul-
sions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at re-
form, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States
to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the. . . safeguards must be observed.
Id. at 467.
144. Id. at 479.
145. Id. at 469-72.
146. The Miranda decision does not prevent all confessions from being used as evidence.
Voluntary confessions by persons not under police custody remain admissible, id. at 478, as
do confessions by suspects in custody who were warned of their rights and "knowingly and
intelligently" chose to confess, id. at 475, 478. The Court found these rules necessary to
allow for effective law enforcement. Id. at 481.
147. Id. at 475.
148. Id. at 479.
149. .d. at 480 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
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evidence, and 4) protecting the suspect's privacy rights. 150 A close read-
ing of Miranda suggests that interests (1) and (2) were of primary im-
portance to the Court, while interests (3) and (4) were viewed as having
very little to do with the values protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The Miranda Court did not explicitly address interest (3), reliabil-
ity of evidence, as a goal of the privilege. Language in Miranda does
suggest, however, that interest (4), protection of privacy, had little to do
with the outcome of the case. The Court specifically noted that sus-
pects may be interrogated in some circumstances if counsel is present
even though the suspect desires to remain silent.' 5' Had privacy pro-
tection been a central concern, the Court likely would have condemned
not only the use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda, but
also the fact of the interrogation itself, especially if the suspect desired
to be left alone. 152 Subsequent cases confirm that privacy is not a sig-
nificant interest protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
153
The evil the Miranda Court meant to eliminate arises not from the pri-
vacy intrusion-the questioning of the suspectl 54-but from the use of
150. See supra notes 95-105 & accompanying text.
151. If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney pres-
ent, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be per-
missible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the
presence of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation
process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of
these statements.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44. Justice Frankfurter had made a similar point in another
context: "The Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative questions [to grand
jury witnesses]." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
152. The Court did say that if the suspect asserts his right to consult with a lawyer "there
can be no questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Likewise "the police may not ques-
tion him" if he indicates he does not want to be interrogated. Id. While such language may
imply a violation of the fifth amendment at the moment of questioning, the Miranda rule
prohibits only the use of improperly obtained statements. "[T]he prosecution may not use
statements . . . unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, unless the govern-
ment introduces the evidence against the suspect, the privilege against self-incrimination is
not violated. See infra notes 155-56 & accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) (quoted supra note 52).
The Fisher Court did acknowledge, however, that the prohibition against coercing testimo-
nial responses does in fact protect privacy interests. Id. at 399. See supra note 52.
154. Questioning a suspect without giving Miranda warnings does not itself violate his
constitutional rights or create a cause of action for a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 or 1985. Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 208, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Moreover, non-
custodial interrogation is not covered by Miranda but may sometimes be intrusive to pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (incriminating statements
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compelled statements against him. 155 Such use is the gravamen of a
violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 56
The Miranda Court was primarily concerned with interests (1) and
(2), maintaining an accusatorial system 157 and protecting the suspect's
obtained by federal agents while questioning a suspect not in custody and in his home held
admissible even though no Miranda warnings given).
155. The Court's position on this point was later made clear in Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308 (1976), in which the Court said that Miranda is violated only when a statement
elicited without full compliance with its demands is used in a criminal prosecution. Id. at
315. Therefore, the Baxter Court saw no constitutional impediment to using statements
obtained without the Miranda safeguards in "non-criminal" prison disciplinary proceedings.
Id.
State court opinions have offered similar interpretations. The fifth amendment is vio-
lated "only when [a defendant's] statements, taken without the necessary observance of his
protection, are used against him in a criminal case." Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 26
N.Y.2d 70, 75, 256 N.E.2d 536, 538, 308 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1970). Similarly,
Noncoercive questioning is not in itself unlawful [and] Fifth . . . Amendment
rights protected by. . . Miranda are violated only when evidence obtained without
the required warnings and waiver is introduced against the person whose question-
ing produced the evidence. The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the
privilege against self-incrimination. . . [which] is not violated when the informa-
tion elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used against him ... . Unlike un-
reasonable searches and seizures. . . there is nothing unlawful in questioning an
unwarned suspect so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologically
coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not use against the suspect any
evidence obtained.
People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 812-13, 427 P.2d 772, 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 111-12
(1967).
Thus, Miranda does no more than assure unwarned suspects of "informal use immu-
nity," Ritchie, supra note 17, at 413. But see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 309 & n.5
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Miranda protects a suspect [who is in custody and has re-
quested an attorney] from any interrogation at all"). Some commentators have embraced
the point of view expressed by Justice Stevens inlnnis. See, e.g., Schrock, Welsh & Collins,
supra note 127, at 21 & n.101, 22 n.106, 32-33 n.138; Stone, supra note 17, at 137-41.
156. See supra note 155. Some commentators have taken the contrary view that the
privilege against self-incrimination is violated at the time unwarned suspects are questioned.
See Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 127, at 21; Stone, supra note 17, at 137-41. These
authors argue that because Miranda obviously extends fifth amendment protections to the
police station, it must follow that the privilege can be violated by the mere taking of a
statement without a waiver of Miranda rights. In other words, these authors see the taking
of the statement as a sufficient condition for violation of the privilege. This position suggests
that a suspect's rights would be violated if a "waiverless" statement is written by the suspect
and then torn up by the prosecutor who then drops all charges and releases the suspect,
never to bother him again. However, Miranda is more accurately read as holding that the
taking of a "waiverless" statement is only one necessary precondition for a violation of the
privilege; the additional necessary condition is governmental use of the statement against the
suspect. This reading accommodates Miranda's clear application of the privilege to the sta-
tion house (in much the same way the privilege applies to other non-trial settings such as the
grand jury) but avoids the dubious position that the suspect can "incriminate" himself even
though the government makes no use whatsoever of the "incriminating" evidence.
157. An accusatorial system is characterized by accusation by non-judicial entities, no-
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dignity and free will. The Court was convinced that inquisitorial meth-
ods of station house interrogation were widespread. 158 For example,
the Court noted that police manuals recommended that officers interro-
gate suspects in private and display an air of confidence in the suspect's
guilt.159 Even before Miranda, commentators had argued that such po-
lice practices would lead suspects to fear sanctions for refusing to
speak. 160 By requiring the police to inform suspects of their right to
remain silent, the Miranda Court sought to guarantee that the accusa-
torial safeguards were not rendered meaningless by police interroga-
tion practices.
In addition, the Mfiranda warnings were designed to protect the
suspect's dignity and free will by dissipating the inherently coercive at-
mosphere of police interrogations. 16 1 But the protections were meant
to do more than simply address the evil of coercion. By making the
suspect aware of the privilege against self-incrimination and the conse-
quences of its waiver, 162 the warnings would serve the purpose of en-
abling the suspect to make a rational choice between silence and
confession, thus protecting his or her dignity as a choosing moral
agent. 163 Without knowledge of one's rights, "knowing and intelligent"
waivers are impossible.' 64
The Court noted the importance of deterring improper methods of
interrogation by excluding statements made in violation of the Miranda
warnings requirement. 165 Yet rather than including deterrence in its
tice of charges, public proceedings, prosecutors independent from the judiciary who are re-
quired to carry the burden of proof, jury trials, and prohibition of double jeopardy. L.
LEvY, supra note 84, at 39. An inquisitorial system is characterized by secret proceedings
and a presumption of the accused person's guilt. Id.
158. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-50.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Crimi-
nal Procedure in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1,
31-32 (1965).
161. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-65, 478 ("compelling atmosphere"); Schrock, Welsh
& Collins, supra note 127, at 33-56.
162. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
163. Id. at 475. See id. at 465, 475; Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 127, at 33-56;
see also Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Beneft and the Modern Law of Confessions,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 295. What offended the Miranda Court was "the prospect of a
suspect's making the decision to confess on the basis of an inaccurate awareness of the facts
relating to his case. . . and of the law determining the criminal significance of these facts."
Id. at 296.
164. "[O]ne cannot intelligently. . . waive a right the existence of which one has not
been apprised of. ... Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 127, at 53.
165. "Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as these
decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradi-
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enumeration of interests protected by the privilege,'6 6 the Court ap-
peared to treat such deterrence only as a means to the end of protecting
those interests noted above. 167 Had the Court viewed deterrence as a
constitutional end in itself, it likely would have analogized to the fourth
amendment and recognized a constitutional violation at the moment
inquisitorial methods were employed.' 68 Instead, the privilege against
cated in the foreseeable future." Id. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also George, The Fruits ofMiranda" Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. CoLo. L. Rnv.
478, 489 (1967) (while the "theoretical basis" of Miranda is the privilege against self- incrim-
ination, "the Court's social objective is control of the police"); Comment, Exclusion of Con-
fessions Obtained Without Miranda Warnings in Civil Tax Fraud Proceedings, 73 COLUM. L.
Ray. 1288, 1307 (1973) ("Deterrence [of abusive police interrogations] was essential, in Mi-
randa's view, to preserve fifth amendment rights.").
166. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
167. The Miranda Court did not view police deterrence as a primary purpose of the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule. "[Tihe self-incrimination privilege [culminating in Miranda]
focuses upon a broader interest in protecting the accused's constitutional privilege rather
than solely controlling state abuses." Berger, supra note 95, at 201,203. Miranda signalled a
change in the Court's perception of the problems at the center of the law of confessions: the
"concern was no longer focused upon blatant police misconduct such as physical violence
...[but was now upon] more subtle influences, such as what [the Court] perceived as the
inherently coercive nature of any custodial interrogation." Dix, supra note 163, at 295.
That deterrence of particular methods of interrogation was not a primary goal of the
Miranda Court can be illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose the police, without
giving the warnings, apply Interrogation Method X and the suspect confesses. Miranda
clearly requires excluding the evidence. Suppose, however, that the police give the warn-
ings, the suspect invokes none of his rights, and the police then apply the same Interrogation
Method X. Assuming that Method X does not offend due process, see supra notes 110-22,
then the resulting confession may be admissible.
Deterring undesirable police conduct is an interest of central importance to the due
process coerced confession doctrine. See infra note 168 & accompanying text. In contrast,
according to the Miranda Court, the privilege against self-incrimination provides suspects
with protection during all custodial interrogations. Without the warnings, custodial interro-
gation is "inherently coercive" even if the particular method of interrogation is otherwise
unobjectionable. See supra note 129 & accompanying text.
In order to rectify the shortcomings of the then prevailing law of confessions, the Mi-
randa Court structured the interrogation process to protect the rights of suspects prior to
interrogation rather than resorting to after-the-fact assessments of police methods. So un-
derstood, Miranda seeks to defuse coerciveness in the name of protecting the integrity of the
judicial process and the dignity of the suspect rather than to regulate the interrogation tech-
niques of the police.
The [Miranda] rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other
unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and
deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings
and waivers. Rather, the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. Such an approach would be reminiscent of those due process contexts in which a
constitutional violation is found at the time of the interrogation. Unlike the privilege
against self-incrimination, due process doctrine logically permits a direct application of de-
terrence theory to police misconduct, generating a cause of action at the moment of the
misconduct. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (police brutality
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self-incrimination is violated only when the government attempts to
use an illegally obtained statement. 169
The Emerging Good Faith Exception to Miranda
Five years after deciding Miranda, the Court began narrowing its
scope.170 The Court relied heavily on deterrence theory to define the
scope of Miranda, even though the issue of deterrence was subsidiary to
the fifth amendment values articulated by the Miranda Court. 171 Once
the Court began focusing on deterrence, several Justices urged the
Court to recognize a good faith exception to the Miranda exclusionary
rule.
Deterrence Theory to the Forefront
The seeds of the good faith exception to the Miranda rule were
sown in Harris v. New York,1 72 in which the Court permitted the gov-
ernment to use for impeachment purposes statements that, under Mi-
randa, were inadmissible to establish guilt.' 73 The Harris Court
implied that the Miranda rule has only one purpose: deterring imper-
missible police conduct. 74 Because "sufficient deterrence flows when
the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its
case in chief," the Court saw no reason to exclude the evidence for
purposes of impeaching the defendant. 75
Not only did the Harris Court elevate deterrence theory to a new
creates cause of action for violation of suspect's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
While the "remedy" under the coerced confession cases is exclusion of the confession, see
supra notes 110-22 & accompanying text, theoretically courts could permit the additional
remedy of civil suit against the offending police, or even adopt civil suits as the sole remedy,
at least in cases in which evidentiary reliability is not in question. See Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941).
No such logic applies to the Miranda Court's interpretation of the privilege against self-
incrimination, given two unique factors distinguishing the privilege from due process con-
siderations: I) the privilege is not triggered until the government uses improperly obtained
evidence against the suspect, and 2) exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the privi-
lege is constitutionally required. See supra notes 165-69 & accompanying text; Dershowitz
& Ely, Harris . New York Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971).
169. See supra notes 155-56 & accompanying text.
170. This narrowing process is traced and criticized in Berger, supra note 95, at 203-13,
and Stone, supra note 17.
171. See supra note 150-69 & accompanying text.
172. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
173. Id. at 226. The statements were inadmissible under Miranda because the police
had failed to warn the suspect of one of his several rights.
174. Id. at 225.
175. Id.
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and unwarranted level of importance in Miranda cases, but it reached
suspect conclusions when it applied the theory. 176 Moreover, the Court
disregarded the predominant fifth amendment interests enumerated by
the Miranda Court: maintaining the accusatorial system and preserving
the suspect's ability to make free and rational choices. Such disregard
caused the Harris dissenters to complain:
The prosecution's use of the tainted statement "cuts down on the
privilege by making its assertion costly." . . .Thus, the accused is
denied an 'unfettered' choice when the decision whether to take the
stand is burdened by the risk that an illegally obtained prior state-
ment may be introduced to impeach his direct testimony.177
The dissenters also noted that the "objective of deterring improper po-
lice conduct is on, part of the larger objective of safeguarding the integ-
rity of our adversary system '178
Two Proposals for a Good Faith Exception
Although the Harris opinion did not suggest adoption of a good
faith exception to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule, its emphasis
on deterring police misconduct set the stage for Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion in Michigan v. Tucker. 179 Defendant Tucker, questioned
by police prior to the Miranda decision, was not informed of his right
to appointed counsel.' 80 Through their interrogation of Tucker the po-
lice discovered the identity of a witness, Henderson, who subsequently
testified against the defendant.' 8 ' Although the Court suggested that
Tucker's statements were inadmissible,8 2 it held that the product of his
176. Far from deterring undesirable police conduct, Harris provides an incentive to po-
lice not to warn suspects of their Miranda rights. Stone, supra note 17, at 112. By not giving
warnings, the police enhance the likelihood that the suspect will confess. If the suspect testi-
fies at trial, the confession can be used to impeach him. Because limiting instructions are
generally ineffective, the jury is likely to interpret the confession as evidence of guilt. On the
other hand, if the suspect chooses not to testify, the jury may interpret his silence as evidence
of guilt. Id. See also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 168, at 1220-21.
The fear that the Court may be encouraging police misconduct appears to be substanti-
ated by the case of Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass, the police continued to
interrogate the suspect after he asked to speak with his lawyer. Nevertheless, the Court
allowed his statement to be used for impeachment purposes. .d. at 722. In so doing, the
Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, which believed that inadmissability was neces-
sary in order to achieve deterrence. State v. Haas, 267 Or. 489, 492, 517 P.2d 671, 673 (1973).
177. Harris, 401 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing) (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
178. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
179. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
180. Id. at 436.
181. Id. at 436-37.
182. Id. at 445. Tucker's statements identifying Henderson were not admitted at trial.
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statements-Henderson's testimony-was admissible. 183
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist identified two purposes
for the exclusionary rule in self-incrimination cases: deterring police
misconduct and excluding untrustworthy evidence. 184 The Court
found that the interrogation involved no compulsion abridging
Tucker's fifth amendment privilege, but "departed only from the pro-
phylactic standards later laid down. . . in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege."'' 85 Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Henderson's
statements created no threat of evidentiary unreliability. 86 The Court
made no mention of Miranda's concern for protecting the accusatorial
system or suspects' dignity and free will.187 Given its view of the pur-
poses of the privilege and Miranda's relationship thereto, the Court saw
no reason to exclude the statements. 88
The Court explained its deterrence rationale by analogizing to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' 8 9 Without acknowledging the
fundamental differences between fourth and fifth amendment doctrine,
the Court simply concluded that "[iun a proper case this [deterrence]
rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment context as
well." 190
In dicta,' 91 Justice Rehnquist suggested that the good faith of in-
terrogating officers could justify an exception to Miranda:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in wilful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing
to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.
Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, how-
183. Id. at 452. The interrogation of the defendant took place before Miranda was de-
cided, but the trial took place afterwards. .d. at 435.
184. Id. at 446-48.
185. Id. at 445-46. For a reaffirmation of this "prophylactic" interpretation of Miranda,
see New York v. Quarles, 52 U.S.L.W. 4790 (U.S. June 12, 1984) (No. 82-1213). For a
critique of the view that the Miranda warnings are merely "prophylactic standards," see
generally Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 127.
186. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 449.
187. The Court did suggest that the value of "judicial integrity" was "assimilated" in the
deterrence and evidentiary reliability rationales for the exclusionary rule. Id. at 449 n.25.
188. Id. at 449-50.
189. Id. at 446.
190. Id. at 447.
191. The Court decided the case on the narrow ground that the officers interrogated
Tucker before Miranda was decided, and that they complied with pre-Miranda require-
ments. Id.
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ever, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 192
Chief Justice Burger set out his own theory of the good faith ex-
ception in a dissenting opinion in the later case of Brewer v. Wi!-
liams. 193 The Brewer Court held that statements elicited from the
defendant Williams by police in the absence of counsel must be ex-
cluded because the police conduct violated his sixth amendment right
to counsel. 194 A police officer had appealed to Williams, a murder sus-
pect whom the officer knew was deeply religious, with the now famous
"Christian burial speech" in the hope of eliciting information about the
location of the victim's body.195 Williams had been advised several
times of his Miranda rights and had asserted his right not to make a
statement until meeting with his lawyer.196 Nevertheless, Williams re-
sponded to the speech by telling the police where the body was
hidden. 197
The Chief Justice disagreed with the Court's conclusion that Wil-
liams' statements must be suppressed, arguing that Williams had
waived his fifth amendment right to silence. 198 Further, Burger as-
serted that even if Williams had not waived his right to silence, the
Court would err gravely by applying the exclusionary rule to a "techni-
cal violation" without considering whether the goals of the rule would
be furthered. 99 He emphasized deterrence of unlawful police conduct
192. Id.
193. 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 401-06.
195. Id. at 392-93. While the defendant Williams was being transported in a police car
from Davenport to Des Moines, Iowa, one of the detectives accompanying him, knowing
that he was a former mental patient and deeply religious, made the following appeal to
Williams:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining,
it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to
be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight,
and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top
of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past
the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body,
that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the
little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.
And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until
morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being
able to find it at all.
Id.
196. Id. at 391-92.
197. Id. at 393.
198. Id. at 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 420.
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as the only valid reason to exclude reliable and probative evidence.2 o
Indeed, Burger characterized Miranda's exclusionary rule, like its
fourth amendment counterpart, as a "judicially conceived remedial de-
vice" 20 1 to be applied only when "egregious" police conduct precedes
the suspect's statement,20 2 or when the facts of a particular case call
into question the reliability or voluntariness of the statement.20 3 "Mi-
randa's safeguards are premised on presumed unreliability long associ-
ated with confessions extorted by brutality or threats; they are not
personal constitutional rights, but are simply judicially created prophy-
lactic measures. '204 The Chief Justice argued that because Williams'
statements were voluntary and reliable, and were not preceded by egre-
gious police conduct, they should be admissible.20 5 Burger implicitly
rejected the Miranda Court's notion that, because the interrogation at-
mosphere remains "inherently coercive" when police questioning con-
tinues after a suspect has asserted his right to remain silent, such
questioning is improper.20 6
The Burger and Rehnquist theories are similar. Both draw analo-
gies to fourth amendment doctrine and propose a case-by-case analysis
of interests to determine whether exclusion is called for under Mi-
200. Id. at 421.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 422. The Chief Justice's statements in Brewer are reminiscent of his views on
police deterrence before joining the Supreme Court. In a case in which the suspect was
warned, signed a waiver form, but objected to a police officer's writing down the confession,
then-Judge Burger argued that the confession should be admitted as a waiver of Miranda
rights:
The record demonstrates entirely reasonable police activity satisfying the deterrent
purposes underlying the Miranda rule. There is not a scintilla of evidence sug-
gesting that what had been forthcoming from Appellant's lips was the result of
unreasonable or improper police conduct. The fact that Appellant may not have
desired the statement to be transcribed does not compel the conclusion that he was
being subjected to the kind of police activity found unconscionable in Miranda.
The most that can be said from Appellant's statements is that he may have uninten-
tionally incriminated himself.
Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
203. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 420-22 (Burger, C.J,. dissenting).
204. Id. at 423.
205. Id. at 423-24. Concurring in Brewer, Justice Marshall also considered police con-
duct a crucial factor. However, he favored excluding the evidence on the grounds that the
police "consciously... set out to violate Williams'... privilege against self- incrimina-
tion." Id. at 407 (Marshall, J., concurring).
206. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("Once warnings have been given, the subsequent pro-
cedure is clear. If the individual indicates. . . that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. . . . [A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be
other than the product of compulsion.").
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randa.207 The cost of excluding highly probative evidence of guilt20 8 is
weighed against the benefits of exclusion: deterring police misconduct
and protecting against unreliable evidence.2 09
The theories differ, however, in the quality of police conduct nec-
essary to justify exclusion based upon the deterrence rationale. As with
his fourth amendment good faith doctrine, 210 Chief Justice Burger
would utilize deterrence theory to exclude evidence automatically only
in cases of "egregious" police conduct,21' while Justice Rehnquist, on
the other hand, would probably call for exclusion of evidence obtained
through negligent as well as intentional police misconduct.212
Critique of the Good Faith Exception
The good faith exception theories of both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist suffer from flawed reasoning and fundamental doc-
trinal errors.
207. A subtle difference in the extent to which the respective theories would apply a
balancing test or case-by-case analysis should be noted. Given his rejection of the view that
custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, at least in cases in which the Miranda warn-
ings have been given, Burger appears to favor employing a case-by-case analysis in all Mi-
randa cases not involving egregious police misconduct.
Thus, in cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made without coer-
cion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, but are obtained in viola-
tion of one of the Miranda prophylaxes, suppression is no longer automatic.
Rather, we weigh the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the
normative Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against "the strong in-
terest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all con-
cedely relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce."...
This individualized consideration or balancing process with respect to the exclu-
sionary sanction is possible in this case, as in others, because Williams' incriminat-
ing disclosures are not infected with any element of compulsion the Fifth
Amendment forbids; nor, as noted earlier, does this evidence pose any danger of
unreliability to the factfinding process. In short, there is no reason to exclude this
evidence.
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, seems to give some credence to the "inherent
coercion" finding. He apparently grants that Tucker's statements would be inadmissible
even though no actual evidence of coercion or evidentiary unreliability existed. See supra
note 182 & accompanying text. Therefore, Rehnquist might favor limiting the case-by-case
analysis to cases such as the derivative evidence situation in Tucker when the questionable
evidence is not the direct product of a Miranda violation.
208. Excluded evidence is often highly indicative of guilt. In Brewer, for example, the
victim's body was found exactly where Williams said it would be. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 393.
209. See supra notes 184-88, 199-207 & accompanying text.
210. See supra note 74-77.
211. See supra notes 202, 207 & accompanying text. But see infra note 283.
212. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-52.
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Flawed Reasoning
Chief Justice Burger advocates admitting evidence in some cases
even though it was obtained by means of a "technical violation" of the
defendant's Miranda rights.2 13 His theory lends itself to several possi-
ble interpretations. First, Burger may be saying that the type of "tech-
nical" violation of the Miranda "prophylaxes" involved in Brewer is
really not itself a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
2 14
However, this interpretation cannot explain the Court's imposition of
the Miranda doctrine upon the states had the Court not considered it to
be constitutionally mandated. 21 5 In addition, this interpretation cannot
be reconciled with the Miranda Court's intent to move beyond the ear-
her case-by-case due process analysis toward a clear rule requiring ex-
clusion of evidence whenever the requirements of Miranda are not
met.216 Miranda violations, including those violations of the self-in-
crimination privilege found in Miranda itself, are often "technical" in
the sense that no actual coercion is demonstrated. 21 7 The point of Mi-
randa is that actual coercion is not a prerequisite to inadmissability.
The Miranda rule precludes any evidence obtained through custodial
interrogation devoid of the warnings, or without a valid waiver once
213. See supra text accompanying note 199.
214. See supra text accompanying note 204.
215. The Tucker Court's characterization of the Miranda warnings as no more than pro-
phylactic safeguards of the self-incrimination privilege has been the subject of scholarly crit-
icism, much of which regards that characterization as inconsistent with Miranda. See, e.g.,
Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 127, at 38-41; Stone, supra note 17, at 123.
The Miranda Court itself suggested the constitutional status of the Miranda exclusion-
ary rule:
It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue [of warnings] until
state legislative bodies have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by rule
making .... [H]owever, the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and
must be determined by the courts .... As courts have been presented with the
need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so. That was
our responsibility when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today.
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making
or legislation which would abrogate them.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490-91.
216. See supra notes 142-45 & accompanying text; see also Stone, supra note 17, at 118
(the Tucker Court's conclusion that violations of self-incrimination clause occur "only if
confession is involuntary under traditional standards" is an "outright rejection of the core
premises of Miranda").
217. Indeed, the Miranda case itself involved no apparent coercion. The interrogation
of Ernest Miranda lasted only two hours, was conducted by two officers in an interrogation
room, and evidenced no physical or psychological coercion of the suspect. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 447. The Court stated that "overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys"
need not be shown in order to justify exclusion. Id. at 455-56.
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the warnings are given, from being used against the suspect.
218
A second interpretation of Burger's view in Brewer v. Williams
suggests that even if Williams' fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was violated, his statement nevertheless should be admis-
sible if the constitutional interest in excluding it is outweighed by the
government's interests, and if the violation was merely "technical." If
this is the Chief Justice's position, fifth amendment rights are in jeop-
ardy of being routinely balanced away. The Court has never suggested
that a violation of the constitutionally based privilege against self-in-
crimination is a matter of degree.219 Furthermore, if only "egregious"
police misconduct triggers the exclusionary rule, evidence will seldom
be suppressed even though the dictates of Miranda have not been
met.220
Perhaps Burger would argue, as he has in objecting to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, that instead of applying the "Draco-
nian" exclusionary rule, alternative remedies for fifth amendment vio-
lations should be devised.221 However, such alternatives are logically
impossible in self-incrimination cases. While there may be reason to
doubt the constitutional necessity of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule,222 the fifth amendment privilege is itself a constitutionally re-
quired exclusionary rule.22 3 Whereas a fourth amendment violation
occurs at the moment of the unlawful privacy violation,224 violations of
the privilege against self-incrimination do not occur unless and until
the government uses the tainted evidence against the defendant in a
criminal proceeding.225 Although alternatives to the exclusionary rule
might conceivably be developed to protect fourth amendment privacy
218. Id. at 444-45.
219. The constitutional language that "no person.., shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself," see supra note 84, suggests an absolute bar against
coerced self-incrimination.
220. Indeed, one could hardly characterize the conduct of the interrogating officers in
Miranda as "egregious." See supra note 217.
221. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 66. Bur-
ger intimated in his Brewer dissent that alternatives to the exclusionary rule should be de-
vised. He asserted that the majority's decision keeps "the Court.. . on the much-criticized
course of punishing the public for the mistakes and misdeeds of law enforcement officers,
instead ofpunishing the officer directly, if in fact he is guilty of wrongdoing." Brewer, 430
U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
222. See supra notes 47-73 & accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying note 73; see also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 168, at
1214; Ritchie, supra note 17, at 388-89 & n.37; Stone, supra note 17, at 110-11.
224. See supra notes 50-51 & accompanying text; see also Ritchie, supra note 17, at 417
& n.168.
225. See supra notes 155 & accompanying text.
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interests,226 no alternative could possibly protect the fifth amendment
values of maintaining an accusatorial system and respecting the dignity
of criminal defendants. If use of compelled self-incriminating evidence
is permitted, the fifth amendment's protection is destroyed. Admitting
the evidence and resorting to "alternative remedies" such as civil suits
against governmental officers responsible for the self-incrimination
would protect neither the defendant's right to a free and rational choice
nor his right to a trial within an accusatorial system of criminal justice.
Under any interpretation, adoption of Burger's argument in
Brewer that evidence may be admissible despite a Miranda violation
would threaten the viability of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Similar problems pervade Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Tucker.
Justice Rehnquist's approach, as described in his Tucker opin-
ion,227 contains two inconsistencies. First, because he suggests that
Tucker's statement (as opposed to Henderson's) likely would be inad-
missible, he appears to accept Mfiranda's premise that custodial interro-
gation is inherently coercive. 228 This recognition, however, seems
contrary to his view that the sole justifications for Miranda's exclusion-
ary rule are to deter police misconduct and to protect against unreliable
evidence.229 If these are, indeed, the only purposes of Miranda,
Tucker's statement, like Henderson's, should be admissible given the
absence of actual coercion and the obvious good faith of the interrogat-
ing officer.230 Moreover, if the failure to advise Tucker of his right to
appointed counsel automatically rendered his subsequent statement
inadmissible, one wonders how the Miranda warnings can be viewed as
merely prophylactic standards rather than as constitutionally mandated
requirements of the privilege against self-incrimination itself.23'
Second, since Retnquist's opinion for the Court assumed that
226. See, e.g., Y. KAMIsAR, supra note 113, at 236-41.
227. See supra notes 179-94.
228. Rehnquist stated that Tucker's statements might be inadmissible even though there
was no evidence of actual coercion. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445, 452. But see Justice Rehn-
quist's statement in the context of the "public safety" exception to Miranda: "Today we
merely reject the only argument that respondent has raised to support the exclusion of his
statement, that the statement must bepresumed compelled because of [the officer's] failure to
read him his Miranda warnings." New York v. Quarles, 52 U.S.L.W. 4790, 4792 n.5 (U.S.
June 12, 1984) (No. 82-1213) (emphasis in original).
229. See supra note 184 & accompanying text.
230. The absence of coercion negates the concern that Tucker's statement might be un-
reliable. The "good faith" of the interrogating officer is established by the fact that his only
"unlawful conduct" was to give three, rather than all four Miranda warnings at a time when
Miranda had not yet even been handed down.
231. See supra note 185 & accompanying text.
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Tucker's statement identifying Henderson could not be used against
him,232 principles of derivative evidence, established in the analogous
context of the immunity grant cases, should have been applied to pre-
clude the use of Henderson's statement as well.233 When the govern-
ment promises immunity in exchange for testimony, the suspect waives
the privilege but gains equivalent protection by virtue of the guaran-
teed immunity.234 Any immunity grant sufficient in scope to replace
the fifth amendment privilege must protect against the use not only of
the immunized testimony but also of all evidence derived from the im-
munized testimony.235 The privilege against self-incrimination pre-
vents the government from using not only the immunized testimony
itself but also any evidence derived therefrom against the recipient of
immunity.2 36 Thus, if Tucker's statements were compelled by the gov-
232. See supra note 182.
233. See supra note 94 & acccompanying text. The derivative evidence doctrine is
analogous to the fourth amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine that requires ex-
clusion of secondary evidence obtained by exploiting an initial violation of the fourth
amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
Whether Miranda establishes such a derivative evidence rule is unclear. The Miranda
opinion did include a single sentence arguably advocating a derivative evidence rule: "But
unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant]." Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). Courts and commentators are not in agreement
on this issue. Compare United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (Ist Cir. 1981) (evidence
found by means of a key discovered as a result of federal agent's request for defendant to
empty his pockets after the latter had asserted his right to counsel must be excluded), with
Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 422 (1982) (evidentiary fruits of statements obtained
in violation of Miranda not automatically excluded). See Friendly, supra note 84, at 712;
George, supra note 165, at 487-89; Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 579, 619-20 (1968).
It is important to note that, unlike the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment is not
violated until the government seeks to use the tainted evidence against the suspect. See
supra notes 155-56 & accompanying text. Even though in Tucker the government did not
seek to use the defendant's own statement, it may be that since Tucker's statement would
have been inadmissible under the Miranda rule had the government sought to use it, the
government should likewise be precluded from using Henderson's statement, as it was de-
rived directly from Tucker's.
234. See infra note 235.
235. Couselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). The Counselman Court
struck down a federal immunity statute that granted witness protection only against the use
of the witness' testimony itself. The Court held the statute invalid because it "could not, and
would not, prevent the use of [the witness'] testimony to search out other testimony to be
used against him." Id. at 564. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459 (1972)
(scope of the fifth amendment privilege is "co-exteasive with" use and derivative use immu-
nity); see also C. WHITEB READ, supra note 2, at 261.
236. See supra note 94 & accompanying text; see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S.
450 (1979) (immunized grand jury testimony held inadmissible even for purposes of im-
peaching defendant's testimony at trial).
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eminent, the fifth amendment should have forbidden not only their use
but also the use of Henderson's statements. The purpose of such pro-
tection is not to discipline or deter the police,237 but "to maintain intact
the practical protection against incrimination" provided by the privi-
lege.238 Unless Henderson's statements are excluded, the government
is permitted to use Tucker's tainted statements as a decisive link in the
chain of evidence against him thereby circumventing the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against self-incrimination. 239
Fundamental Doctrinal Errors
Despite their differences, the Rehnquist and Burger theories share
common weaknesses. They both unduly emphasize evidentiary relia-
bility as a crucial value underlying Miranda's exclusionary rule.240
Apart from the fact that the Miranda Court did not address the issue of
evidentiary reliability,241 that issue had perhaps already assumed a po-
sition of secondary importance under the coerced confession doc-
trine.242 More importantly, both Justices view deterrence of police
misconduct as the main objective of Miranda.243 Fundamental doctri-
nal errors lie at the heart of this interpretation of Miranda.
237. In the witness immunity context the purpose of the derivative evidence rule is not
"to discipline the police or lower judiciary as such." George, supra note 165, at 481. Rather
the purpose is to protect the individual's fifth amendment right not to be a witness against
himself. Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1028 n.21 (1966).
The same fifth amendment values are at stake in applying the derivative evidence rule to the
police interrogation setting in Tucker. See infra notes 273-74 & accompanying text.
238. George, supra note 171, at 481. See supra notes 101-09, 156-68 & accompanying
text.
239. [I]f the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained confessions for links
and leads rather than being required to gather evidence independently, then the
Miranda warnings would be of no value in protecting the privilege against self-
incrimination. The requirement of a warning would be meaningless, for the police
would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish di-
rectly, and there would exist no incentive to warn.
Pitler, supra note 233, at 620. Justice Holmes' comment in Siverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), is also relevant: "The essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
240. See supra notes 184, 204 & accompanying text.
241. See supra note 113 & accompanying text.
242. See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
243. In discussing the exclusionary rule in Tucker, Rehnquist asserted that its "prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (citing United
States v. Calandra, 441 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). Similarly, the Chief Justice stated in his
Brewer dissent: "[D]eterrence of unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful police conduct is
the only valid justification for excluding reliable and probative evidence from the criminal
fact finding process." Brewer, 430 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Rehnquist and Burger theories draw an untenable analogy
between fourth and fifth amendment jurisprudence.244 As discussed
above, since Mapp v. Ohio245 the Court has clearly distinguished the
fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules, defining the former as a
subconstitutional rule aimed at deterring invasions of privacy, and the
latter as a constitutionally mandated guardian of the rights of criminal
defendants and the accusatorial system of justice.2 46 As the Court said
in Janis: "In contrast to the Fifth Amendment's direct command
against the admission of compelled testimony, the issue of admissibility
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is deter-
mined after, and apart from the violation. '247
If the fourth amendment exclusionary rule lends itself to a balanc-
ing approach, it does so for two reasons, neither of which apply in self-
incrimination cases: 1) the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally mandated;248 and 2) the exclusionary issue arises "after
and apart from" the violation of fourth amendment privacy fights; ex-
clusion is contingent on a prior substantive violation. The contingent
status of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule logically leads to a
balancing analysis that takes into account governmental "good faith"
as well as possible alternatives that might adequately protect fourth
amendment privacy rights without incurring the heavy costs entailed in
suppressing reliable and probative evidence.249 Such an approach is all
the more defensible in light of the fact that the substantive violation
and the issue of exclusion are analytically distinct in fourth amendment
cases. Because a substantive violation of fourth amendment privacy
interests always precedes the exclusionary issue, deterrence of future
invasions of privacy naturally becomes a prime concern in structuring
fourth amendment remedies.
None of these considerations is apposite in the fifth amendment
context. The fifth amendment exclusionary rule is clearly dictated by
the Constitution250 and is the only possible means of protecting the val-
ues underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.25' No violation
of privacy, or of any other constitutionally protected substantive inter-
est, precedes the invocation of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule.
244. See supra notes 189, 200-02 & accompanying text.
245. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
246. See supra notes 30-76 & accompanying text.
247. Janis, 428 U.S. at 443. See supra note 73.
248. See supra notes 19-73 & accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 74-83 & accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 215, 223, 246-47 & accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 221-26 & accompanying text.
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The constitutional issue arises only when, and only because, the gov-
ernment seeks to use at trial tainted evidence against the defendant. 252
Given this understanding of the self-incrimination clause, one
must conclude that deterrence theory is of minimal use in analyzing the
Miranda exclusionary rule. After all, what unlawful government con-
duct is to be deterred by exclusion under the Rehnquist and Burger
theories? Surely not invasions of the suspect's privacy interests.253 The
constitutional interest in avoiding physical brutality or undue psycho-
logical coercion of the suspect is protected by enforcement of due pro-
cess rights.2 4 Perhaps Justices Rehnquist and Burger believe it is the
failure to give the Miranda warnings that is the "unlawful act" to be
deterred through application of the exclusionary rule. The Burger
Court has suggested as much: "The deterrence of the exclusionary rule,
of course, lies in the necessity to give the warnings. ' 255 Yet, the failure
to give the warnings is not itself unlawful.256 The "illegality" arises
only when the government uses evidence obtained without having
given Miranda warnings.257
Because deterrence theory is inapposite to analysis of Miranda ex-
clusionary rule issues, governmental "good faith" or its absence is also
irrelevant. Miranda cases are properly resolved simply in terms of
whether or not the dictates of the decision have been followed. If, in a
252. See supra notes 155-56 & accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 108-09, 151-56 & accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 111-20 & accompanying text; see also supra note 168.
255. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975). The Court made a similar point in
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975): "The function of the [Miranda] warnings relates to
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against coerced self-incrimination, and the exclusion of a
statement made in the absence of the warnings, it is said, serves to deter the taking of an
incriminating statement without first informing the individual of his Fifth Amendment
rights." Id. at 600-01.
256. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
See supra notes 155-56 & accompanying text; Ritchie, supra note 17, at 417 n.168 ("When
the police compel the accused to make incriminating statements.., his privilege against
self-incrimination is not yet infringed; it is only when these statements are used against him
at trial that a violation occurs.. . .Thus, prohibiting use of the compelled statementspre-
vents a violation of the privilege.") (emphasis in original).
257. See supra notes 151-52 & accompanying text.
[I]f the failure to give warnings is not in itself unlawful, the deterrent concern
seems irrelevant. If the only illegality consists of use of the evidence, that can be
handled simply by excluding the evidence when the situation arises; it is unneces-
sary to consider whether allowing the evidence to be used will encourage the police
not to give warnings.
Stone, supra note 17, at 140 n.217. "If, in violating Miranda, the police do not necessarily
violate the privilege, then the Court's discussion of deterrence makes sense only if the Court
is honoring or creating an exclusionary rule for violation of the Miranda safeguards alone."
Ritchie, supra note 17, at 417 n.168.
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given case, the requisites of Miranda have been ignored, then the self-
incrimination clause mandates that the improperly obtained evidence
be excluded.
Application of the Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule:
Contravention of Fifth Amendment Imperatives
The Chief Justice explicitly advocates a balancing test in his
Brewer dissent,2 58 and Rehnquist appears to adopt a similar case-by-
case approach in his Tucker opinion.2 59 By injecting into the admissi-
bility question considerations beyond government adherence to the
warnings requirement, such a balancing approach would eviscerate the
protections the Miranda court sought to guarantee. Admission of evi-
dence obtained without giving Miranda warnings undermines the core
constitutional policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion: maintaining an accusatorial system of criminal justice, and pro-
tecting the dignity of suspects by assuring them a free and rational
choice to confess or not. The following examples illustrate the threat
posed by the adoption of a good faith exception to the Miranda rule.
Uncommunicated Miranda Warnings
Situations might arise in which police officers attempt to inform
suspects of their Miranda rights but, for one reason or another, the sus-
pect never understands the information.2 60 Assuming complete good
faith by the police, the Rehnquist and Burger theories would seemingly
require admission of confessions obtained in such cases even though
the core Miranda values would thereby be offended.
To pose an extreme hypothetical, suppose the police do not realize
that a suspect is illiterate and deaf. Upon arrest the police take the
258. See supra notes 207-08 & accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 192, 207 & accompanying text. Such an analysis might lead to the
anomaly of excluding a confession in the name of deterrence even if the suspect was af-
forded full Miranda protection. Suppose that Officer A begins to interrogate Suspect, pur-
posely failing to give the warnings. Officer A leaves the room momentarily, during which
time Officer B, unbeknownst to A, enters the room and gives Suspect the warnings. B leaves
and A returns still assuming that Suspect is unwarned and continues the interrogation, again
without giving the warnings. Suspect confesses. If deterring unlawful police activity is in-
deed the prime purpose of Miranda's exclusionary rule and if the failure to give the warn-
ings is the "unlawful police activity" which must be deterred, see supra text accompanying
notes 249-50, then the confession should be suppressed to deter Officer A even though Sus-
pect may in fact have made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.
260. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 51 Ala. App. 387, 391, 286 So. 2d 62, 65-66 (Crim. App.
1973) (emotional upset and drug injection); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972) (intoxication).
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suspect to the station where they immediately present him with a writ-
ten copy of his Miranda rights, which they read to him in a slow and
careful manner. At the conclusion of the reading an officer asks the
suspect if he understands his rights. The suspect, who can speak as well
as read lips, looks up from the floor for the first time just as the officer
asks and, without thinking, answers "yes." The officer then asks the
suspect if he wants to discuss the crime. The suspect, who has again
read the officer's lips, immediately blurts out a confession.
While several lower courts would quite correctly analyze the
above situation in terms of whether the suspect's confession constituted
a valid waiver of Miranda rights, and would likely exclude the evi-
dence, 26' admissibility could be mandated under the Rehnquist and
Burger good faith approaches. If police deterrence were the primary
justification for excluding otherwise reliable confessions obtained in vi-
olation of Miranda, the confession would not be excluded, given the
absence of police misconduct, regardless of the fact that the warnings
were never communicated to the suspect. No deterrent purpose could
possibly be served by excluding the confession.
However, since the primary purposes of the Miranda rule are to
protect the suspect's right to a "free and rational choice" as to whether
he should confess, and to preserve the accusatorial system of criminal
justice, then the confession in the hypothetical must be excluded.262
Without actual communication of the warnings, the suspect could not
"rationally" make the decision to waive his rights to silence and to
counsel. The government could not possibly carry its "heavy bur-
261. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 51 Ala. App. 387, 391, 286 So. 2d 62, 65-66 (Crim. App.
1973) (confession inadmissible because suspect did not understand Miranda warnings due to
emotional upset and drug injection); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 917 (Alaska 1973)
(mental illness does not invalidate Miranda waiver so long as suspect is "basically rational");
State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 629 (Me. 1972) (waiver of Miranda rights by mentally dis-
turbed suspect is valid if suspect is "in touch with reality" and "fully aware of and appreci-
ate[s] the nature and quality" of what is involved in waiving rights); State v. Basden, 19 N.C.
Ct. App. 258, 259, 198 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1973) (low intelligence not an automatic bar to
Miranda waiver so long as suspect "freely, voluntarily and understandingly" waives); Com-
monwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 393, 309 A.2d 384, 387 (1978) (mental illness not an
automatic bar to waiver if totality of circumstances shows that the statements were the prod-
uct of a rational intellect and free will); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972) (intoxication will invalidate waiver if suspect "was unaware of
his rights and unable to make an intelligent waiver"). The Supreme Court has held that, in
assessing waivers of Miranda rights by juveniles, the inquiry is based essentially on "whether
[the juvenile] has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Fare v. Michael C., 422
U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
262. See supra notes 157-60 & accompanying text.
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den 263 of showing that the suspect had "knowingly and intelligently"
waived his Miranda rights.264 While the case of the deaf suspect de-
scribed above may be unlikely to occur, it serves to illustrate the impro-
priety of appealing to deterrence theory and good faith considerations
to assess the admissibility of confessions obtained contrary to Miranda.
The same analysis suggested above should also apply in the more com-
mon cases of suspects who hear but do not understand the warnings
due to intoxication, mental disease or retardation, or poor language
skills.
"Excited Utterance" Interrogation
The so-called "excited utterance" cases 265 provide another set of
situations in which a good faith exception would appear to permit the
use of confessions elicited by custodial interrogation not preceded by
the Miranda warnings. These cases involve an officer's question ut-
tered in shock or surprise rather than in an attempt to elicit information
about a crime.266 Suppose this variation on the facts of a recent case267:
A suspect is arrested for burglary. A pat down search reveals a condom
containing a white powdered substance. Surprised, the officer immedi-
ately asks the suspect without giving the Miranda warnings, "What's
this?" The suspect responds, "You know what it is. It's heroin."
While the Miranda rule presently requires exclusion of such a
statement as an improperly obtained product of custodial interroga-
tion,268 Justices Burger and Rehnquist would probably urge admission
of the evidence. The suspect's statement was "voluntary" and would be
263. See supra note 147 & accompanying text.
264. See supra note 146.
265. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 113, at 214 (Supp. 1983).
266. Id
267. Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
860 (1981).
268. Id. at 874. The "excited utterance" of a police officer likely constitutes "interroga-
tion" under Miranda. The Harryman court concluded that Miranda applied: "[I]t is enough
to decide that what the officer said could reasonably have had the force of a question on the
accused." Id. Subsequent to Harrytnan, the Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), provided a definition of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes that also
suggests that the "excited utterance" in the text constitutes "interrogation."
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to
either express questioning or its functional equivalent. . . . [Iinterrogation under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.
Id. at 300-01 (emphasis in original).
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viewed as "reliable" evidence. 269 Most importantly, this police conduct
is not of the type that can be deterred by excluding the statement. Ex-
cited utterances are impulsive, spontaneous responses to unusual cir-
cumstances and are therefore inherently non-deterrable. 270 The good
faith exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule would therefore per-
mit admission of the suspect's response to the officer's excited question.
Such a result is inconsistent with Miranda and the principles un-
derlying the privilege against self-incrimination. The unwarned sus-
pect is constitutionally entitled to protection from governmental use of
incriminating statements obtained from custodial interrogation, absent
a knowing and intelligent waiver of fifth amendment rights. This rigid
reading of Miranda was originally intended by the Court.271 The intent
and motive of the interrogating officer, as well as the voluntariness and
reliability of the statement, are irrelevant if the suspect is unwarned. 272
Plainly, in excited utterance cases the suspect has no chance to know-
ingly and intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination.
In addition to its theoretical inconsistency with Miranda, the good
faith exception in excited utterance cases poses substantial practical dif-
ficulties. How is "excited utterance" interrogation to be clearly distin-
guished from regular questioning? An excited utterance exception
would enable the police to feign excited utterances in hopes of ob-
taining confessions from unwared suspects. While such deception
certainly should be considered "bad faith" conduct, distinguishing
these cases from the actual excited utterance situation would be diffi-
cult. Such an approach would be reminiscent of the case-by-case due
process rules eschewed by the Miranda Court. More importantly, de-
fining Miranda rights in terms of the interrogating officer's subjective
state of mind would unwisely and unnecessarily misdirect the analysis
of the suspect's rights. By focusing on the officer's state of mind, the
good faith doctrine neglects the critical issue: the suspect's understand-
ing of his rights.
"Good Faith" Interrogation in the "Rescue Situation"
A variation on the facts of Brewer v. William 273 provides a third
class of cases to which the good faith exception would likely be applied.
269. See Harryman, 616 F.2d at 873; see also supra notes 111-20 & accompanying text.
270. Deterrence theory assumes rational decisionmaking processes; non-rational actions
cannot be deterred.
271. Harrymnan, 616 F.2d at 873; see supra notes 139-42 & accompanying text.
272. Harryman, 616 F.2d at 874.
273. 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (discussed supra notes 193-206 & accompanying text).
January 1984] GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Suppose the police reasonably believe that the suspect has kidnapped a
small child and hidden her in a place where she will die if not immedi-
ately rescued. Hoping to discover the victim's location, the police pur-
posely fail to warn the suspect of his Miranda rights and interrogate
him about the kidnapping. The suspect then informs the police where
the child is located and she is rescued. The government seeks to use the
suspect's statement against him at his kidnapping trial.
If, as in the Chief Justice's view, the good faith exception should
apply to the statements elicited by the "Christian Burial" speech in
Brewer,274 then confessions obtained through interrogation motivated
by the desire to save human life would, afortiori, be admissible. Seem-
ingly, Justice Rehnquist's approach would also favor admission of
statements obtained when the police interrogation is conducted for the
purpose of rescuing a victim of crime. Surely, saving lives is a value to
be encouraged even when it collides with the strictures of Miranda. As-
suming balancing were the proper mode of analysis, the victim's right
to life would outweigh the suspect's Miranda interests.275 In such cir-
cumstances, the police do act properly in interrogating the suspect. Pro-
ponents of the good faith exception would therefore argue that
Miranda should pose no bar to admitting the suspect's statement into
evidence. 276
While interrogating unwarned suspects in order to save lives may
be proper police conduct,277 it does not follow that Miranda provides
no bar to the admissibility of evidence obtained through such interro-
gation. The privilege against self-incrimination is not negated by the
concession that police interrogation of unwarned suspects is justified.
Far from "negated," the Miranda rule is not even implicated until the
government attempts to use the tainted evidence. 278 Therefore, it fol-
274. Id. at 415-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
275. Professor Kamisar has asserted that a majority of the Court would have excluded
the statements in Brewer had the "speech" of the interrogating officer been motivated by a
desire to save the life of the victim. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 9 (1978).
276. California courts have admitted into evidence statements obtained without giving
the suspect the requisite warnings when the custodial interrogation was motivated primarily
by a desire to save the victim's life. See, e.g., People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 756, 148
Cal. Rptr. 170, 173 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d
875, 884, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 561 (1974); see also Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in
Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. Rav. 657, 677 n.86 (1966).
277. If, however, police resort to physical coercion to elicit lifesaving information, due
process limitations might be implicated. See supra notes 112-20 & accompanying text. But
see Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982) (coerced evidence of kidnap victim's
whereabouts obtained through police threats and physical violence held admissible).
278. See supra notes 154-56, 168-69 & accompanying text.
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lows that "the police may in fact acquire the lifesaving information so
long as they do not attempt to use it to prosecute the defendant." 279
Excluding statements obtained in such situations is unlikely to cre-
ate a substantial disincentive to the police to obtain the lifesaving infor-
mation from unwarned suspects. Police officers genuinely concerned
with saving lives would continue to seek such information even at the
risk of jeopardizing subsequent conviction of the suspect. Further-
more, officers would likely realize that information obtained in rescue
situations might still be admissible under the existing "inevitable dis-
covery" exception to Miranda.28° Moreover, even if the suspect's state-
ment is inadmissible to prove guilt, it may be admissible for
impeachment purposes should he take the stand at his subsequent
trial.281
For several reasons, the good faith exception should not be used to
circumvent Miranda for the benefit of victims. Apart from its unjustifi-
able infringement of the suspect's right to be informed of the conse-
quences of making a statement, an exception to the exclusionary rule in
rescue situations would pose practical problems. As in the "excited ut-
terance" context, the rescue situation would require courts to consider
the subjective intent of interrogating officers. Distinguishing interroga-
tion motivated by a genuine concern for saving life from questioning
based on a mere pretext of rescuing victims (for example, when the
police question the suspect about the location of a victim they know is
dead) would be difficult. Furthermore, once established in rescue
cases, the good faith exception would likely spread into a variety of
other "emergency" contexts. The evidentiary use of weapons or drugs
obtained solely from information provided by unwarned suspects could
be justified by a desire to remove dangerous instrumentalities from so-
ciety.282 Thus extended, the "rescue exception" would undermine the
279. Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?" Caiffornia's Anticipatory, Application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLA L. REV. 59, 120 (1966) (footnote omitted).
280. The "inevitable discovery" doctrine permits the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence if eventually it probably would have been discovered in a lawful manner. See People
v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050
(1973) (admitting weapon found in closet as result of police questioning in violation of Mi-
randa because the police "inevitably" would have discovered the weapon in the course of
normal investigation regardless of suspect's statement). In the sixth amendment context, the
Court held in Nix v. Williams, 52 U.S.L.W. 4732 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 82-1651), that
evidence that inevitably would have been discovered need not be excluded at trial because
of independent police misconduct.
For a discussion of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine, see Y. KAMISAR, supra note 113,
at 821-23.
281. See supra notes 172-75 & accompanying text.
282. Such an argument was made in a case just decided by the United States Supreme
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unambiguous exclusionary rule established by the Miranda Court.
Good Faith: The Exception or The Rule?
The above cases illustrate particular factual contexts in which the
good faith exception could operate. While the doctrine might be con-
fined to these somewhat unusual situations, no principle would so limit
it once it became an established element in Miranda analysis. Indeed,
taken to an extreme the doctrine could be used to admit evidence in
any case in which police do not purposely circumvent Miranda.
The police clearly are not particularly enamored with Miranda,
and a complete emasculation of the doctrine would be possible through
resort to the good faith exception. Even officers who purposely fail to
give the warnings might, in some cases, convince the courts that the
failure was inadvertent and in good faith, and therefore not the kind of
conduct deterrable through application of the exclusionary rule.283 If
so, failure to warn could quickly become the order of the day as the
police would feel "unleashed" from the restraints of Miranda.284 Jus-
tice Brennan's fears of sacrificing the fourth amendment exclusionary
Court. In New York v. Quarles, 52 U.S.L.W. 4790 (U.S. June 12, 1984) (No. 82-1213),
defendant was frisked and handcuffed by police who noticed that defendant had an empty
shoulder holster. Without giving the Miranda warnings, the police asked defendant where
the gun was and the defendant immediately told them. While the state court held the gun
and the statement inadmissible, one judge dissented, arguing for a variation of the good
faith exception: "In my view, under the circumstances, the police responded to an emer-
gency situation in an entirely reasonable manner and, therefore, suppression of the weapon
and defendant's statements cannot be justified." People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 667, 444
N.E.2d 984, 986, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (1982) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Counsel for the
state made a similar claim at oral argument before the Supreme Court, arguing that the
officer's actions were 'necessary and prudent' as means of finding the gun before someone
was injured. Justices Ponder Permissible Extent of Pre-Miranda Questions, 34 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 1071-72 (Feb. 8, 1984).
The Court was persuaded by these arguments. Deciding that the gun and the statement
were admissible evidence, the majority carved out a "public safety" exception to Miranda
over a strong dissent. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, regardless of the motiva-
tion of the interrogating officer, "overriding considerations of public safety justiflied] the
officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating
the abandoned weapon." Quarles, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4791-92. Although the Court did not
base its reasoning on the good faith of the interrogating officer, it did embrace a balancing
approach in which the interests of public safety are weighed against fifth amendment values.
See id at 4791-93. Such an analysis is surely consistent with the Burger and Rehnquist good
faith theories described in this Article, and may well portend an era of expansive recognition
of a good faith exception to Miranda.
283. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 113, at 557-58; LaFave, supra note 8, at 357-58 (pro-
police bias of judges). The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule may depend on whether
the goal of exclusion is "specific deterrence" of the particular police officer who obtained the
evidence or "general deterrence" of police misconduct. See id. at 346-47.
284. See LaFave, supra note 8, at 358 (discussing fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
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rule on the altar of deterrence theory285 could well be borne out in the
fifth amendment context as well. The core Miranda values of assuring
an accusatorial system and protecting the suspect's right to make a free
and rational choice whether to incriminate himself would be overrid-
den by a misplaced and doctrinally unsound emphasis on deterring po-
lice misconduct.
Conclusion
Whatever the merits of a good faith exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, the Court should not adopt a similar ex-
ception to the Miranda rule. Because the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is based on deterrence principles, it can be argued that a good
faith exception is appropriate. In contrast, the Miranda exclusionary
rule is grounded on the constitutional mandate of the self- incrimina-
tion clause itself. Therefore, good faith issues are irrelevant to the de-
termination whether incriminating evidence is admissible.
Nevertheless, as a result of its improper emphasis on deterrence as the
primary goal of the Miranda exclusionary rule, the Court has imperiled
the core values underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.
Adoption of a good faith exception would signal a return to a case-by-
case analysis of subjective factors,286 the very approach found wanting
by the Miranda Court. Worse, if the state were permitted to compel a
witness to incriminate himself on the ground that his interrogator
meant no harm, the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimina-
tion would be eviscerated.
If the Court's real purpose is to gut Miranda, it should face the
issue directly and overrule the case.287 If Miranda is to die, however, it
deserves "a more respectful burial"2 8 with the Court justifying its de-
mise with cogent reasoning. The present approach of obliquely sap-
ping Mfiranda's strength through appeals to such devices as the good
faith exception disserves the quest for an analytically sound law of con-
fessions and lessens respect for the Court's ability to coherently fashion
constitutional doctrine.
285. See supra note 61.
286. See supra notes 111-24 & accompanying text. Others have so read Tucker, the
leading case espousing the good faith doctrine. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 95, at 205;
Ritchie, supra note 17, at 416-19; Stone, supra note 17, at 123.
287. Because a direct reversal of Miranda might be politically untenable, the Court
might prefer a piecemeal dismantling of the rule. See Stone, supra note 17, at 169.
288. Justice Harlan made a similar plea when the Court overruled Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
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